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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
KENNECOTT COPPEE CORPORA-
TION, a corporation, and 
BINGHAM AND GARFIELD RAIL-
WAY COMPANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 




The decision of the defendant, which is here 
the subject of review, was rendered on the 23rd day 
of July, 1953. On the 18th day of August, 1953, 
plaintiffs filed in this Court their Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari to review and annul that decision. 
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18th day of August, 1953, and was served upon the 
defendant on that day. Pursuant to that writ, 
defendant certified and filed with this Court the 
proceedings and evidence taken in the case. The 
jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under Section 
59-13-46, Utah Code 1953. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED. 
The questions presented are: 
1. Whether in determining plaintiffs' State 
Franchise Tax under Section 80-13-21(6) (c), Utah 
Code 1943 (Sec. 59-13-20(6) (c), Utah Code 1953) 
defendant may attribute to Utah, as the amount 
of plaintiffs' gross receipts from business assign-
able to Utah, the gross receipts from sales of copper, 
molybdenum, platinum and palladium produced by 
its Utah Copper Division and sold outside of Utah. 
2. Whether said State franchise taxes as im-
posed by the defendant, tax income from activities 
beyond the jurisdiction of this State arid thus de-
prive plaintiffs of due process of law within the 
meaning of Section 7 of Article I of the Constitu-
tion of Utah and Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States and 
2 
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unduly burdens interstate commerce in violation of 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, and Article I, Section 
10, Clause 2 of the Constitution of the United 
States; and whether the defendant's attempt to 
impose and to exact payment thereof as a condition 
to the continued conduct of plaintiffs' interstate 
business within the State of Utah pursuant to the 
prohibition of Sections 59-13-61 and 59-13-62, Utah 
Code 1953, would burden interstate commerce. 
3. Whether under Section 80-13-8(9) (a) (b), 
Utah Code 1943, (Sec. 59-13-7(9) (a) (b), Utah Code 
1953), for the purpose of the depletion deduction, 
the term "net income from the property" means the 
net income derived from the sale of the mineral 
production obtained from the property less all costs 
and expenses incurred in the production and sale 
of such products. 
4. Whether, for the calendar year 1942, the 
defendant has either jurisdiction or authority but 
to obey the mandate of this Court in its Case No. 
7298 and whether the defendant's attempt to change 
the allocation of Kennecott's net income within and 
without the State of Utah for purpose of the State 
franchise tax for that year, or otherwisa to exceed 
or elaborate upon that mandate, is beyond its power 
and void. 
3 
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5. Whether m the light of the facts disclosed 
by this record the defendant is empowered to assess 
interest on deficiencies, should any such be found. 
STATEMENT 
This suit is one to review the decision of the 
defendant and its assessments thereunder of the 
corporation franchise tax against these plaintiffs 
for the years 1942 to 1950, both inclusive. The 
plaintiff Bingham and Garfield Railway Company 
was a wholly-owned subsidiary of the plaintiff Ken-
necott Copper Corporation (hereinafter sometimes 
called "Kennecott"), and plaintiffs' return was a 
joint return for each of the years 1942 to 1948, 
inclusive; in each of 1949 and 1950 the return was 
that of Kennecott Copper Corporation alone. Bing-
ham and Garfield Railway Company ceased opera-
tion April 30, 1948, and was dissolved June 30, 
L951, Kennecott Copper Corporation succeeding to 
ill the Railway Company's assets and agreeing to 
fulfill and discharge all contractural obligations of 
the Railway Company. Whatever obligation, if any, 
there be by reason of the corporate franchise tax 
assessments here the subject of review will be Ken-
necott Copper Corporation's obligation solely. 
Furthermore the matter here in issue pertains exclu-
sively to the operation of Kennecott Copper cor-
poration; therefore, the plaintiffs hereafter will be 
referred to in the singular as Kennecott. 
4 
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The issue it* one of power or authority m the 
defendant to proceed as by its decision below, under 
the statutes and Constitution of the State of Utah 
and the stated provisions of the Constitution of the 
United States. The defendant State Tax Commission 
(hereafter sometimes called the "Commission") is 
created by statute and has only such powers as the 
statute confers upon it. Such powers must be exer-
cised in accordance with the statute. E. C. Olsen Co. 
vs. State Tax Commission, 109 Utah 563 at 570, 168 
P. 2d 324. 
The defendant had before it some 700 pages of 
oral testimony and a multitude of voluminous 
exhibits. Numerous witnesses appeared for the 
plaintiff. In not a single instance wras their testi-
money contradicted. The facts as presented by 
the plaintiffs witnesses are established without con-
tradiction. The defendant was required to make 
and should have made its finding of fact and have 
rendered its decision upon the evidence before it. No 
new or additional evidence may now be introduced, 
but the cause is to be heard on the record before the 
Commission as certified to by it. The decision of 
the Commission may be reviewed by this Court both 
upon the law and the facts. Section 59-13-46, Utah 
Code 1953. 
Because of the voluminous nature of the record, 
we do not desire to burden this Court by pointing out 
the many instances where the findings of fact by the 
5 
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Trail*. 
defendant are not supported by the testimony and 
evidence presented before it. Consequently, this 
brief is based upon facts that are not in dispute 
between the Commission and Kennecott because, on 
the basis of such facts alone, Kennecott believes its 
contentions are amply sustained. 
F. 4, Ex. Kennecott is a New York State corporation 
49 (2), which, since its incorporation in 1915, has always 
Tr. 1G4 had its principal office and place of business in New 
Ex. York City. During all years here under eonsidera-
24(2) - tion this office was located at 120 Broadway, New 
42(2) York City. These were the principal executive, 
Tr. 571 administrative and financial offices of the Corpora-
et seq., tion, where the Corporation's president and other 
574 principal officers had their offices, where the Board 
45,46, of Directors regularly held its meetings and where 
48, 341 there was located a large force of executives, admin-
istrative, accounting and clerical personnel. It was 
from these offices in New York that Kennecott con-
ducted and administered its extensive operations, 
including its several directly-owned mining proper-
146 ties located in the State of Utah and in other parts 
et seq., of the United States, and the affairs of its various 
149 subsidiaries located in the United States and in 
et seq. foreign countries. It was from these offices that 
Kennecott conducted and controlled the sales of its 
mineral products, including sales made by Kenne-
cott Sales Corporation (a wholly-owned subsidiary 
of Kennecott organized under the laws of New 
6 
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Trans. 
155,169 York), as agent for Kennecott. It was in a part of 
Ex. the space rented by Kennecott for its offices at 120 
41(2), Broadway that the Kennecott Sales Corporation 
42(2) (hereinafter sometimes called the "Sales Corpora-
575 tion") had its office and place of business. 
Kennecott followed a divisional method of ac-
342 counting for its various operations and affairs. One 
of these divisions was the so-called Utah Copper 
Division which covered the operations of Kennecott 
with respect to its Utah properties and the further 
processing and ultimate sale of the products of such 
properties. The Utah Copper Division thus covered 
the activities conducted by or in connection with 
Kennecott's properties, offices and business within 
the State of Utah, and those in relation thereto con-
ducted by or in connection with its head office in 
New York. The Commission has held, and Kennecott 
in this case does not dispute, that the tax returns 
of Kennecott for the Utah corporation franchise tax 
and the tax determinations to be made for purposes 
of that tax relate only to such part of the activities 
and income of Kennecott as is represented by its 
Utah Copper Division, excluding from such tax 
returns and such determinations the income or 
affairs of other divisions of Kennecott, Accordingly, 
in this case, it is understood that unless clearly 
indicated to the contrary, reference to Kennecott 
and its operations and affairs relate solely to those 
7 
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Tram*. 
included under the broad designation set out in this 
paragraph as the Utah Copper Division, 
in Utah, Kennecott is the owner of and operates 
the Utah Copper Mine and a precipitating plant in 
Bingham Canyon, in Salt Lake County, Utah, and 
is the owner of and operates two ore concentrators 
at Magna and Arthur, respectively, both being in 
the vicinity of the settlement of Magna, also in Salt 
Lake County, Kennecott is also the owner of and 
F. 10,12 operates certain transportation facilities between its 
Tr. 43, mine and concentrators and between the concen-
131-2 trators and the smelter of the American Smelting 
and Refining Company at Garfield, in Salt Lake 
County, Utah. 
Ex. To recover the metals, most precipitates and all 
iii (2), copper concentrates must be smelted, the metals 
18(2), being thus converted into what is known as blister 
19(2) copper. Kennecott delivered its precipitates and 
Tr. 44, concentrates to various smelters at various locations, 
165, 267 some 'within the State of Utah and some in states 
other than the State of Utah, and for a negotiated 
fee those smelters performed their operation as a 
bailee for Kenneeott's account. Almost all of the 
copper concentrate during the taxable years in-
volved was shipped to and smelted at the nearby 
Garfield, Utah smelter of American Smelting and 
Refining Company (hereinafter sometimes called 
" A . S . & B . " ) . 
8 
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Trans. 
The blister copper resulting from the smelting 
operation contains the copper and other metals, 
which, to produce a commercially marketable prod-
166, 208 uct, must be refined so that the refined metals will 
be separated one from the other. There being no 
Ex. refinery within the State of Utah,* refining was 
iii(2), performed in states other than Utah, for the most 
Tr. 43, part by A. S. & E. at its eastern refineries located 
138,166, at Baltimore, Maryland and Perth Amboy, New 
216, 268 Jersey, always for a negotiated fee and as a bailee 
for Kennecott's account. Transportation from the 
smelters to the refineries was by Kennecott as the 
shipper and over the trans-continental railroads at 
published tariff rates. After refining, the refined 
metals were delivered to Kennecott in states other 
than Utah. 
F. 11, There was no market in the State of Utah for 
Tr. 44-5, any part of Kennecott's production, either unrefined 
53,146, or refined; Kennecott in fact produced no com-
179,186, mercial product in Utah other than molybdenite con-
207, 213, eentrates and a relatively small quantity of precipi-
336, 339, tates, all of which, however, were sold by the Sales 
620 Corporation, as agent for Kennecott, in states other 
than Utah for delivery to buyers located outside 
Utah. Net income being the end and necessary result 
* Kennecott's refinery in Utah began operations in 
October 1950, but since its production was insig-
45,180 nificant in the period here involved the parties 
have mutually disregarded it. 
9 
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Trans, 
of its operation, Kennecott was required to find and 
develop in states other than Utah the required mar-
ket for its production, and Kennecott did find and 
develop such market in states other than Utah and 
in those states sold and distributed its production 
on the open market and completed its operation by 
converting its production into money or income in 
those states other than Utah. 
Kennecott's operation in and out of the State 
of Utah was one continuous, indivisible, closely inte-
grated operating unit, the single ultimate purpose of 
which was the production and sale of mineral prod-
51 ucts. Only the mining of the crude ores, coneentra-
et seq. tion and smelting, if smelted in Utah, were accom-
plished within the State of Utah; but the necessary 
processes of smelting, where smelted outside Utah, 
and refining and the sale, distribution and delivery 
of all refined metals wherever refined, were accom-
plished wholly outside Utah. The operation was 
indivisible, continuous and uninterrupted from the 
mining of the crude ores within the State of Utah, 
to and including the realization of the first com-
mercially marketable product and the sale, distri-
bution and delivery thereof outside of and beyond 
339 Utah. 
Kennecott's operation within and outside Utah 
was an unitary business for which the "Massachu-
setts" formula as embodied in Section 80-13-21(6), 
256, 259 Utah Code 1943, (Sec. 59-13-20 (6), Utah Code 1953), 
10 
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Trana. 
was devised and, as in many others of the states, was 
adopted by Utah. The parties are here in agreement 
that this statutory formula is to be applied in this 
ease. They are also in agreement upon the manner 
of calculating and applying the first and second 
factors of that formula — (6) (a) and (b) — with 
respect to property and payroll. The only question 
between the parties relating to the application of 
this statutory formula is regarding the manner of 
determining the third factor — (6) (c) and (6) (e) 
(1st) — with respect to gross receipts and the man-
ner in which sales made without the State of Utah 
are to be assigned in computing that factor; which 
is Question 1 here presented. Question 3 here pre-
sented with respect to depletion affects determina-
tion of the total net income subject to allocation but 
does not affect determination of the third factor (6) 
(c) assigning gross receipts to business transacted. 
Kennecott Sales Corporation was and is a cor-
Ex. poration of the State of New York, a wholly-owned 
51(2), subsidiary of Kennecott, created by Kennecott to 
164 perform the function of selling Kennecott's produc-
tion. The only business office of the Sales Corpora-
tion was located at, was embraced within and was 
actually included in and was a part of the premises 
rented by Kennecott, constituting Kennecott's princi-
pal place of business, being that in the Equitable 
630 Building at No. 120 Broadway in New Y'ork City. 
The Sales Corporation at all the times herein in-
volved acted as Kennecott's agent in negotiating 
11 
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..: • . : -and effecting sales of the copper and molybdenite 
: produced by Kennecott from its Copper Mine in 
. ;.;'. Utah and performed that function in accord with 
policies determined by Kennecott and obedient to 
the direction and instructions given to it by Kenne-
615-6 cott from its principal office in New York. No title 
Ex. to these products ever passed to the Sales Corpora-
QQQ tion; on the contrary title remained at all times in 
(2), Kennecott until delivery of the product to pur-
P. 49, chasers. The product was never consigned to the 
171,172, Sales Corporation, nor was the Sales Corporation 
175, 219, ever in possession of the product it sold. The Sales 
216, 609 Corporation was not engaged in any manner of busi-
ness within the State of Utah. 
Until delivery of the refined copper to buyers 
outside of Utah, the refined metal was held for 
Kennecott by the refineries located outside of this 
State, Kennecott's shipment being made of specified 
tonnages in specific shapes to particular points as 
170 directed by the Sales Corporation upon the authority 
of Kennecott and on Kennecott's behalf. Molybde-
nite was produced in Utah and delivered therefrom 
to buyers in states other than Utah on instruction 
179,187 from the Sales Corporation, again for and on behalf 
of Kennecott and by Kennecott's authority. 
- Ex. 
iii(2), Platinum and palladium were sold by A. S. & R, 
Art. 10, for Kennecott's account and as Kennecott's agent. 
p.. 14 . 
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Gold and silver were sold from Kenneeott's 
principal place of business in New York City directly 
546-565 by Kennecott to and were purchased by the refin-
eries. 
The relative importance of the sales of the 
mineral products is indicated by the following sum-
mary of the percentages of the total dollar sales 
during the years 1942 to 1950, inclusive: 
(a) Sales by Kennecott Sales 




Total for copper and 
molybdenite 87.79% 
(b) Sales directly by Kennecott 
to A.S. & R : 
Gold .....10.18% 
Silver 2.02 
Total for gold and silver 12.20 
(c) Sales by A.S. & R. as agent 
for Kennecott: 
Platinum and palladium.... .01 
Total sales 100% 
The Commission's decision attributed to busi-
ness assigned outside Utah, receipts from sales of 
gold and silver, and these sales are not in issue in 
13 
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this case. Since sales of platinum and palladium 
constituted only a small fraction of 1% of total sales 
(approximately $96,000 in the aggregate) during 
the taxable years involved, our discussion of the 
third or gross receipts factor, will primarily relate 
to the sales of copper and molybdenite. 
Varying Positions Taken by the Commission 
For an understanding of this case and its rec-
ord as it now comes before this Court, it seems 
necessary to note the various and inconsistent posi-
tions which the Commission has taken with Kenne-
cott over a period of years with respect to 
(a) the allocation of net income within and with-
out the State for the purpose of this tax, 
and 
(b) the determination of depletion allowable. 
1. For 1941 and prior years (before the years 
1942 to 1950, inclusive, which are involved in the 
present controversy), the Commission had consis-
tently applied the statutory formula for allocation 
and in determining the sales factor of such statutory 
formula had recognized that all sales of the mineral 
products were without the State of Utah and were 
not to be brought into the numerator in determining 
the allocation fraction. Depletion, as a deduction 
from total net income before allocation within and 
14 
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without the State, had also been consistently deter-
mined by the Commission at 33%% of the entire net 
income from the sales of the mineral products with-
out use of any algebraic formula or otherwise 
excluding any part of the income from such mineral 
products as not subject to percentage depletion. 
The returns filed by Kennecott for 1942 and 
subsequent years followed in these particulars the 
same standards as before for allocation of income 
in accordance with the statutory formula and for 
computing depletion on the entire net income from 
the mineral product. 
2. The Commission in its March 10, 1945 pro-
posed adjustments with respect to the 1942 tax first 
applied an algebraic formula for determination of 
the net income from the property as the basis for 
the depletion computation. (This formula will be 
discussed in Point II of this brief.) However, the 
allocation of net income to the State of Utah was 
made on the basis of the statutory formula attribu-
ting all sales of mineral products outside the State 
of Utah. 
This was the basis for the determination of the 
1942 tax as that case was then brought before this 
Court, Kennecott Copper Corporation v. State Tax 
Commission, 221 P. 2d 857 (1950). 
15 
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A particular issue in that case was whether 
Federal income and excess profits taxes should be 
deducted in computing net income for purposes of 
depletion. This Court decided that they should be 
so deducted and that issue was definitely deter-
mined and so is not an issue now pending before 
this Court. Such taxes have been so deducted in 
the determinations for the years 1942 to 1950 which 
are now before this Court and Kennecott raises no 
contrary contention in this respect. 
This Court did not in that case pass on the 
question of the use of the algebraic formula and 
method for determining depletion but remanded the 
case to the Commission for further determination. 
No question was there raised by Kennecott, the 
Commission or the Court as to the use of the statu-
tory formula for allocation of income within and 
without the State, nor as to the computation thereof. 
3. The Commission in 1951 presented in a 
series of amended reports its revised determinations 
for 1942 and for all subsequent years to 1950 inclu-
sive. In such determinations, it continued to apply 
the algebraic formula for the depletion computation. 
However, for the first time instead of applying the 
statutory formula, it substituted its algebraic 
formula to determine that portion of the Utah Cop-
per Division's net income from mineral production 
to be allocated within the State of Utah for taxation. 
16 
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It was m respect to these reports for the years 
1942 to 1950, inclusive, and the computations thus 
made as to depletion allowable and income allocable 
to the State of Utah, that Kennecott filed its several 
petitions for redetermination of deficiencies and 
thus instituted the Commission's hearings below. 
4. The hearings with respect to such deter-
minations wTere opened December 4, 1951 and pro-
ceeded on this basis until April 2, 1952. At that 
time, the Commission again changed its position 
and presented its new determinations in its Exhibit 
PPP(2 ) (Tr. 432). In these revised determinations, 
the Commission acknowledged that the statutory 
allocation formula was to be applied in the alloca-
tion of income in place of a determination based on 
its algebraic formula which it had applied in its 
1951 determinations and which had theretofore been 
the subject of the hearings. It, however, still ad-
hered to the use of the algebraic formula in deter-
mining depletion. This explains the reason for con-
siderable testimony and argument in the record of 
the hearings directed to the use of the algebraic 
formula for determining income allocation which 
is now no longer pertinent to the issues, under the 
changed position of the Commission. 
The Commission, however, in applying the 
statutory formula for allocating income to the State 
of Utah adopted a new theory, never before applied 
or suggested by it since enactment of the franchise 
17 
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tax, under which it ascribed gross receipts from all 
sales of metallic products, even though made by or 
in connection with the principal office of the corpo-
ration in the State of New York, as being gross 
receipts attributable to business carried on within 
the State of Utah. It was this point which was 
particularly dealt with in the hearings as they there-
after continued before the Commission. 
5. The Commission in its decision below some-
what modified the position taken in its revised 
demand presented during the course of the hearings 
and attributed gross receipts from sales of gold and 
silver to business carried on without the State of 
Utah. However, it continued to hold that gross 
receipts from sales of the other mineral products 
were to be attributed to business carried on within 
Utah, even though there was no question but that 
such sales were made entirely without the State of 
Utah and that none of such sales were to customers 
located in the State of Utah. The major question 
relative to such other products involved the sales 
of copper and molybdenite. These sales were made 
on behalf of Kennecott by the Sales Corporation, its 
wholly-owned subsidiary, as sales agent of Kenne-
cott from or in connection with the principal office 
of Kennecott in the State of New York. A minor 
question involved was as to sales of platinum and 
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palladium sold by A. S. & R. as agent for Kennecott 
pursuant to agreement made in and supervised 
from New York and connected with the principal 
office of Kennecott in the State of New York. 
After this long extended history and frequent 
and material changes by the Commission of its posi-
tion, the questions which now come before this Court 
as to these matters are with respect to the propriety 
of: 
1. The Commission's determination of the sales 
factor to be applied in allocation of the total 
net income in accordance with the statutory 
formula; and, 
2. The Commission's method of determining 
depletion deductible in computing such total 
net income, including its use of the algebraic 




Receipts from sales of products produced by Ken-
necott's Utah Copper Division were not gross receipts 
from business done in Utah and cannot be attributed 
to business carried on within Utah nor included in the 
numerator of the gross receipts factor as from business 
assignable to Utah; and, if the franchise tax statute 
were to be interpreted and applied as determined by 
the Commission, it would be unconstitutional. 
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:
 The question discussed in this portion of the 
brief involves the proper construction, as applied to 
the facts in this case, of Section 80-13-21 of the Utah 
Code of 1943, (Sec. 59-13-20, Utah Code 1953) 
(originally enacted in 1931 and in effect during all 
of the years in question) and the constitutionality 
of that section if construed as the Commission has 
construed it. 
The Franchise Tax Act imposes an annual 
franchise tax for the privilege of doing business in 
this State in any year in an amount equal to 3% of 
the net income of the corporation for the preceding 
year "computed and allocated to this State in the 
manner hereinafter provided." Laws of Utah 1931, 
Ch. 39, Section 4, as amended by Laws of Utah 1935, 
Ch. 89, Section 80-13-3 (Sec. 59-13-3, Utah Code 
1953). 
Section 80-13-21, Utah Code 1943, (Sec. 59-13-
20, Utah Code 1953) sets forth the rules for deter-
mining the portion of net income assignable to busi-
ness done within Utah, upon which the tax is based. 
The statute first specifies rules relating to alloca-
tion within or without the State of certain items 
such as rents, interest, dividends, and gains and 
losses from sale of capital assets. Then subsection 
6 specifies the statutory "three-factor" allocation 
formula applicable to the remainder of its net in-
come if the corporation carries on any business out-
side of Utah. In the formula equal weight is given 
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to three separate ' f a c t o r s v ( a ) : tangible property 
within the State, (b) payroll assignable to the State, 
and (c) gross receipts from business assignable to 
the State. The specific language of the gross receipts 
factor is as follows; 
(e) The amount of the corporation's gross 
receipts from business assignable to this State 
shall be the amount of its gross receipts for the 
taxable year from 
(1st) Sales, except those negotiated or 
effected in behalf of the corporation by agents 
or agencies chiefly situated at, connected with 
or sent out from premises for the transaction 
of business owned or rented by the corporation 
outside this state, and sales otherwise deter-
mined by the tax commission to be attributable 
to the business conducted on such fjremises, 
In determining that portion of the net income of 
Kennecott's Utah Copper Division assignable to 
business done within this State, the Commission by 
its decision below attributed to business carried on 
within Utah, in purported compliance with the above 
"gross receipts" factor of the allocation formula, all 
of the gross receipts from all of the sales of copper, 
molybdenite, platinum and palladium of the Utah 
Copper Division, although all of suqh sales were 
made outside of Utah to buyers located outside of 
1
 this State by agents operating from offices outside 
'.*.: of this-State, As a< result,-the.Commission arrived 
. ~i 'fite-to allocaiian to Ut^h ...odL'such gross-receipts 
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ranging from approximately 83% to 89% for such 
years. When combined with the other allocation 
factors prescribed by the statute, this resulted in an 
allocation to Utah of from approximately 90% to 
94% of the total net income of the Utah Copper 
Division. 
Kennecott contends that none of such gross 
receipts from sales outside of this State should be 
attributed to business carried on within Utah in 
applying the gross receipts factor; such gross re-
ceipts are the result of business carried on in a 
state other than Utah. As a result the numerator 
of the gross receipts factor should be substantially 
zero and the resulting percentages of net income 
allocated to Utah would range from approximately 
63% to 65%. 
The Commission attributed all of the gross 
receipts from sales of gold and silver to business 
done outside of Utah, and with this Kennecott is in 
agreement. As indicated above, the sales of platinum 
and pallidium are but an infinitesimal part of the 
total gross receipts here involved. Accordingly, the 
statements made hereafter in this Brief will relate 
only to the sales of copper and molybdenite, except 
where otherwise indicated, and the argument will 
be addressed primarily to those sales. 
As we believe the argument which follows 
clearly demonstrates, the Commission in so apply-
ing the formula prescribed by the statute dis* 
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regarded both the purpose and the letter of the 
statute and, if the statute is to be applied in the 
manner in which the Commission has applied it, the 
resulting tax on Kennecott would be in violation of 
the Federal and State constitutions as a denial of 
due process of law and an undue burden on inter-
state commerce. 
A. In the case of a corporation doing business both 
within and outside the State of Utah, the franchise 
tax statute is designed to tax only the portion of 
the corporation's net income fairly and reasonably 
attributable to the business done by it within the 
State of Utah. The decision of the Commission 
produces a result obviously at variance with this 
cardinal purpose of the law. 
The Utah franchise tax statute, like that in a 
number of other states, is one embodying the so-
called Massachusetts formula — a three-factor 
formula — for the purpose of determining the por-
tion of the net income of a corporation engaged in 
business both within and without Utah to be taxed 
under the statute. Before discussing the specific 
wording of the statutory formula and showing how 
the Commission's decision is contrary thereto, it is 
appropriate at the outset to consider the purpose of 
the statute and to show how the decision of the Com-
mission is at variance with this purpose. 
The purpose of the Utah statute, as with all 
such apportionment laws, is to impose the State 
Franchise Tax on only so much of the net income of 
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a corporation as is fairly and reasonably attribut-
able to business done within the state. Such a 
standard is necessary to meet constitutional con-
siderations. It is also desirable in the enlightened 
self-interest of this State so as not to discourage 
domestic corporations from extending their activi-
ties beyond the boundaries of the state, nor to dis-
248 courage foreign corporations from prosecuting their 
activities within the state. To accord with that pur-
pose, orderly administration and fairness to tax-
payers require the establishment of reasonable rules 
or methods of allocating income from activities 
within and activities without the state. 
The State of Massachusetts had faced this prob-
lem earlier than did Utah and in order to meet such 
purpose in 1920 adopted a three-factor formula for 
allocation of total net income on the basis of prop-
erty, of payroll and of sales or other gross receipts 
253 within and without the state. This was done in 
recognition of the fact that no single factor could 
be generally applied to give a fair allocation of 
business incomes which arose under many varied 
261 circumstances and conditions; and in the belief that 
those three factors would give a reasonable stand-
ard of measurement generally applicable to meet 
the purpose and intent of the statute. The experi-
ence of Massachusetts with this formula and the 
further consideration of the problem in other states 
had led many states to adopt this so-called "Massa-
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Trans. 
chusetts formula" as the basis for their taxation, 
—with some differences in its specifications in one 
state or another, and with some states writing their 
specifications directly into the law and some few 
other states leaving the specifications to be pre-
scribed by administrative authority. The Utah 
statute, adopted in 1931, included the specific pro-
visions which we shall later discuss, but not intend-
ing these as arbitrary rules which, contrary to the 
purpose and intent of the statute, would allocate to 
the state income which was not fairly and reason-
ably attributable to business carried on within the 
state. 
It is clear from the statute itself, from its legis-
109 lative history, and also from the opinions of this 
etseq. Court construing it that the purpose of the Utah 
Legislature in adopting the franchise statute was 
to tax only such income as is reasonably attributable 
to business done in Utah. Thus, Section 80-13-3 
Utah Code 1943 (Sec. 59-13-3, Utah Code 1953) im-
poses a franchise tax upon net income "computed 
and allocated to this state," and Section 80-13-21 
Utah Code 1943 (Sec. 59-13-20 Utah Code 1953) 
which prescribes the specific statutory apportion-
ment formula, begins as follows: 
-The-portion of net income assignable to busi-
ness done within this State, and which shall be 
the basis and measure of the tax imposed by this 
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chapter, may be determined by an allocation upon 
the basis of the following rules: . . ." (Italics sup-
plied.) 
The Utah statute provides in Paragraph (6) for an 
allocation based on the three factors of property, 
payroll and gross receipts, each of which is given 
equal weight in the final result. In addition, it pro-
vides in Paragraph (8) for a different method of 
allocation when, in a particular case, even this broad 
formula does not give a fair and proper result in 
that it allocates to Utah more or less than "the pro-
portion of net income fairly and equitably attribut-
able to this State" or when necessary to avoid 
"double taxation". 
The Report of the Tax Revision Commission of 
the State of Utah in the year 1929 with respect to 
the State franchise tax then in the process of formu-
lation, contains the following statement at pages 
67 and 6S under the heading, "The Allocation of Net 
Income:" 
"Since the basis of this tax is to be the net 
income from the business done within the State, 
it becomes necessary to provide for a distribution 
or allocation of the net income of any business 
concern among the several states in which it does 
business. No state has the right to tax the capital 
employed or the business done beyond its bor-
ders." (Italics supplied.) (Tr. 109) 
The legislative intent to tax only income reason-
ably attributable to business done in Utah has been 
specifically recognized by this Court. In California 
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Packing Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 97 Utah 
367, 93 P. 2d 463 (1939), this Court stated (93 P. 
2d at 465 and 467-68): 
". . . In providing for the determination of the 
amount of the net income to be used as the basis 
for computation of the franchise tax, the Legis-
lature carefully distinguished between business 
done within the state and business done outside 
the state, so as to confine the operation of the 
tax to business done within the State." 
". . . The language of the statute throughout 
evidences an intent only to determine the fran-
chise tax from income from busines done under 
the franchise from the state, that is business done 
within the state. The various methods of alloca-
tion are designed to restrict the tax to business 
done within the state and to assign to the state 
for taxation that portion of the business reason-
ably attributable to the state. There is also 
apparent a purpose to avoid double taxation." 
A fair and reasonable apportionment of the net 
income was thus intended by the statute and is 
required by it. 
However, as we feel is indicated by the Com-
mission's repeated change in position during the 
course of these proceedings (see pp. 14-19, supra) 
and by the more detailed discussion of its present 
position which follows, the Commission has appar-
ently not been concerned with arriving at a fair 
and reasonable apportionment to Utah of Kenne-
cott's net income from the product of its Utah mines. 
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On the contrary^ the Commission has seemingly 
attempted, in derogation of the fundamental purpose 
of the statute and by recourse to a tortured and, we 
believe, entirely unjustified construction of its lan-
guage, to allocate to Utah the largest possible 
amount of net income. 
The Commission made no attempt to determine 
whether the result it reached was a fair one. In 
Finding No. 69, page 163, it said: "It is not the 
function or prerogative of the Commission to 
attempt to evaluate, by its own judgment, the rela-
tive significance to the production of income of the 
Utah Division of mining and other operations in 
Utah as against the executive operations in New 
York. It is the Commission's function only to deter-
mine the facts; the statute then determines the por-
tion of net income assignable to business done within 
the State." 
The apportionment formula contained in the 
Utah statute is premised on the principle that where 
a single or unitary business is conducted across state 
lines, a fair and reasonable apportionment of the 
net income of the entire operation can be obtained 
only by giving weight to three factors carefully 
selected to reflect the property ownership and the 
activities which produce such income—namely prop-
erty^ payroll and gross receipts. Three factors are 
used, since each factor operates as a check and bal-
ance to the others to prevent an extreme or unfair 
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result which might occur if only one or two factors 
were used. Accordingly, unless all such factors are 
fairly applied and given full effect the whole basis 
of the three-factor formula is negated. 
In this case, the Commission attributed to Utah 
substantially all of the property (approximately 
94% over the years in question) and payroll (ap-
proximately 97%), as to which no objection is made 
by Kennecott. I t also attributed to business carried 
on within Utah all of the gross receipts from the 
sales of the products of the Utah Copper Division 
(other than gold and silver) although admittedly 
none of such sales were negotiated or made within 
this State, none of the persons concerned with sales 
worked out of offices within this State, none of such 
products were delivered to customers within this 
State, and, in fact, no sales activities of any charac-
ter were carried on within this State. The effect of 
such allocation is an overall apportionment of net 
income to Utah ranging from 90% to 94% during 
the taxable years involved. Such a result patently 
violates the intent of the apportionment statute 
when viewed in relation to the very substantial 
activities occurring outside of Utah in connection 
with the production of the net income from the Utah 
Copper Division. 
As evidence of such out-of-Utah activities, we 
need cite only a few of the Commission's own find-
ings as follows: 
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(a) Kennecott directs its industrial enter-
prise, including the operation of the Utah Copper 
Division, from its permanent executive head-
P. 23 quarters in New York. 
(b) Such executive offices in New York keep 
constantly in touch with and coordinate all opera-
tional matters relating to mining, smelting, refin-
ing and selling to the end that Kennecott's far-
flung industrial enterprises throughout the Uni-
ted States and the world will move forward as one 
united cohesive venture, the ultimate goal of w h^ich 
is to mine and treat the ore and sell the products 
P. 24 at a profit. 
(c) The duties and function of Kennecott's 
headquarters in New York are many and varied 
both in respect to relations with operators in the 
field, relations within itself and general relations 
P. 24 with the public and the outside world. 
(d) The activities of Kennecott's head-
quarters in New York relate generally to opera-
tional, development, purchasing and selling mat-
P. 24 ters. 
(e) All of the refining of copper, resulting 
in the production of marketable copper, gold, 
silver, platinum and palladium, occurred outside 
P. 16 of Utah., 
(f) All sales and deliveries to purchasers 
P. 11, of copper and molybdenite by the Sales Corpora-
Tr. 28, tion on behalf of Kennecott were made outside of 
51,52 Utah. 
(g) All sales and deliveries to purchasers 
of platinum and palladium by A. S. & R. in behalf 
P, 53 of Kennecott were made outside of Utah. 
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Tran&. 
(h) All sales and deliveries to A. S. & R. of 
gold and silver by Kennecott were made outside 
F. 54 of Utah. 
It is perfectly apparent from the foregoing and 
Tr. 45 from the undisputed testimony in the proceeding, 
3t seq., that the activities of Kennecott outside of the State 
146 of Utah were both necessary and substantial and but 
et seq. for them the operation of the Utah Copper Division 
would not have been carried on successfully over 
the years involved. Although more detailed facts 
could readily be adduced from the record, the above 
findings of the Commission suffice to reveal, we 
believe, how unreasonable and unrealistic is the deci-
sion of the Commission in attributing to Utah ap-
proximately 93% of net income from the sales of 
mineral products. 
The error of the Commission lies in the fact 
that, in disregard of the legislative intent, it has 
inequitably attributed to Utah sales in no way 
related thereto. Consequently, the primary purpose 
and intent of the statutory formula is defeated. In 
the present case all of the products are sold outside 
of Utah, whereas the property and payroll were for 
almost all of the years 94% and 97%, respectively, 
attributed to Utah. The factual circumstances thus 
present a typical example of the necessity of a fair 
application of all factors of the three-factor formula, 
in order that thereby the gross receipts or sales 
factor may operate to alleviate an otherwise unrea-
sonable attribution of net income to one jurisdiction. 
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As if they were talking about the present case, 
Altaian and Keesling, Allocation of Income in State 
Taxation (2d ed. 1950), explain the purpose of the 
sales factor in the Massachusetts formula as follows 
(p. 129): 
" . . . it is believed that a fairly satisfactory 
apportionment can be made if the purpose of the 
use of the sales factor is kept in mind, namely, to 
balance the property and payroll factors by giv-
ing weight to the elements not reflected by those 
factors and thereby to assist in making a reason-
able apportionment of the entire income among 
the states in which the business is conducted." 
The Commission in its decision, contrary to the 
above quoted principles, has achieved an inequitable 
and unsupportable result by attributing the gross 
receipts from the sales to business carried on in 
Utah in which, admittedly, none of the sales were 
made and none of the selling activities in relation 
thereto took place. 
An example of the inequity resulting from the 
failure to obtain a fair balance by the use of dif-
ferent factors is the case of Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. 
v. North Carolina, 283 U. S. 123, 51 S. Ct. 385, 75 
L. ed. 879 (1931). In that case the Supreme Court 
held unconstitutional a state tax based upon net 
income because the apportionment formula, as 
applied to the particular facts, operated to tax 
profits not attributable to transactions within the 
jurisdiction. This case will be discussed subse-
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quently from its constitutional aspect. The impor-
tant point here is that the North Carolina statute 
utilized only a property factor which resulted for 
most of the years involved in an allocation of over 
80% of net income to that state. The sales office 
was located in New York and sales were made 
throughout the United States (including North 
Carolina) and abroad. The Supreme Court held it 
unnecessary to review the evidence in detail, hold-
ing that, in any aspect of the evidence, the statu-
tory method unreasonably and arbitrarily attributed 
to North Carolina a percentage of income out of all 
appropriate proportion to the business transacted 
there. 
In general, m the case of a manufacturing or 
mining, corporation, such as Kennecott, the payroll 
factor tends to follow the property factor with re-
spect to allocation to the state of income from 
manufacture or mining. Hence, if any substantial 
portion of such a corporation's income is to be 
attributed to another state or states in which the 
vital and important selling, executive and manage-
ment activities are carried on, it is necessary to 
employ and give weight to a sales factor. The use 
of such factor was, obviously, the lacking element 
in the Hans Bees' case, which caused the statute to 
reach an unconscionable result. 
The misuse of the sales factor by the Commis-
sion in the present case has achieved substantially 
the same result as if it had applied only a two-factor 
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formula of property and payroll. Altaian and Kees-
ling, supra, after summarizing the necessity of 
utilizing a sales factor, state the proper basis for its 
application as follows (pp. 126-27): 
"The reasons for the use of the sales factor 
afford a clue to the solution of the problem of 
how sales should be apportioned. If the reason 
for the use of the factor is to balance the other 
two factors, then obviously the sales should be 
apportioned in such a manner as to offset rather 
than aggravate the effects of the property and 
the payroll factors. This consideration rules out 
the use of a number of the possible methods of 
apportioning sales. 
"Thus, apportionment of sales to the state 
where the goods are manufactured or produced 
obviously tends in many situations to emphasize 
further the activities in the state of manufacture, 
which are already overemphasized by the prop-
erty factor and possibly also by the payroll 
factor." 
This reasoning applies directly to the present 
case. Here the obviously unreasonable result ob-
tained by the Commission by attributing all of the 
sales of copper, molybdenite, platinum and pal-
ladium to Utah clearly demonstrates the soundness 
of Kennecott's position and the propriety of an allo-
cation which assigns to business outside of Utah 
sales admittedly negotiated and made outside of the 
State. 
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The foregoing demonstrates the unreasonable-
ness of the result reached by the Commission's deci-
sion. We shall now show that its decision cannot be 
sustained under a proper interpretation and appli-
cation of the specific language of Subsection 6 of 
Sec. 59-13-20, Utah Code 1953, prescribing the form-
ula for assigning gross receipts. 
B. The Commission erroneously construed and applied 
the specific provisions of the statute with respect 
to the gross receipts factor by assigning to Utah 
business which in its entirety was carried on in 
other states. 
1. The gross receipts factor is designed to allo-
cate to Utah only gross receipts from business 
assignable to this State. The decision of the 
Commission contravenes this basic legislative 
intent* 
As is admitted by the Commission in its Find-
ings, all of the gross receipts from the sale of copper, 
molybendite, platinum and palladium derived by 
Kennecott from the Utah Copper Division resulted 
from sales made entirely outside the State of Utah 
to buyers located outside the State and through 
persons operating at or from offices permanently 
located outside the State. No selling activities of 
any character took place in Utah or were carried on 
by persons within or operating from or under the 
supervision or direction of Kennecott's offioe zmthin 
this State. 
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In spite of these facts, the Commission has 
attributed to Utah all of the gross receipts from such 
sales solely on the ground that, in its view, such 
sales were not made in Kennecott's name by Kenne-
cott's own employees at Kennecott's own offices out-
side the State but were made through corporations, 
which it characterized as "factors" or "commission 
merchants," operating in their own behalf from their 
own premises located outside the State. According-
ly, under the Commission's interpretation of the 
statute, the amount of the numerator of the gross 
receipts factor does not depend upon whether the 
sales were, in fact, made out of the State, or by 
Kennecott's employees or agents connected with a 
permanent place of business of Kennecott outside 
the State, or whether the sales were in fact attribut-
able to Kennecott's offices outside the State. 
The statute may not properly be construed as 
the Commission has applied it. This we believe 
evident from the opinions of this Court in the Cali-
fornia Packing case, cited supra. In that case this 
Court was called upon to construe the provisions of 
the statute dealing with the gross receipts factor. 
While the Court was divided as to the manner in 
which the provisions relating to the gross receipts 
factor were to be read, it is clear from both opinions 
(i) that none of the Judges considered the provi-
sions as authorizing the use in the numerator of 
sales not* made within the State or by personnel not 
operating from offices within the State or otherwise 
36 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
not related to sales activities within the State, and 
(ii) that if the statute be otherwise construed seri-
ous questions as to its constitutionality would be 
•raised. • • •••v. ' ; ." : : r~. : 
Moreover, the Commission's construction of the 
gross receipts factor violates the clear intent of the 
statutory language. The basic intent of the statute 
to allocate to Utah only net income reasonably and 
fairly assignable to business done within Utah is 
reflected not only in its general provisions but also 
in the gross receipts factor itself. Thus, Paragraph 
6(e) (quoted on p. 21) seeks to ascertain "the 
amount of the corporations, -gross receipts from, 
business assignable to this •state ..:..--..." (Italics 
added). The. paragraph then assigns to Utah the 
gross receipts from sales: 
"."".• . except those negotiated or effected in 
behalf of the corporation by agents or agencies 
chiefly situated at, connected with or sent out 
from premises for the transaction of business 
owned or rented by the corporation outside this 
state . ' . .". 
The Commission's decision is predicated, as will be 
discussed subsequently, upon an erroneous and nar-
row interpretation of the above "except" clause. 
And it completely disregards the next clause in the 
statute which also excepts from assignment to Utah: 
"..... . sales otherwise, determined by the tax 
commission to be attributable to the business con-
ducted on such premises." '-•* *:; a ;' 
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It is submitted that however technical an inter-
pretation be given to the initial language of the 
"except" clause in Paragraph 6(e), the concluding 
language was clearly designed to attribute to busi-
ness carried on outside Utah sales not fairly attrib-
utable to Utah but which were not encompassed by 
the preceding language of the "except" clause. And 
we believe it evident that, under any interpretation 
of the facts, the sales of the products of the Utah 
Copper Division in this case were attributable to 
permanent premises rented by Kennecott outside of 
Utah. 
Furthermore, the "attributable" clause empha-
sizes the primary statutory intent to attribute to 
Utah only gross receipts fairly assignable to busi-
ness there carried on and establishes the perspec-
tive for construing the other provisions of Para-
graph 6(e). It thus becomes apparent that the real 
and substantive question under the statute is, in 
each case, whether the sales in question resulted 
from sales activity within or otherwise related to 
Utah or whether, on the contrary, they are in fact 
attributable to sales activity permanently carried on 
outside of this State. It is entirely inconsistent with 
the purpose of the statute to attribute to Utah gross 
receipts from sales which had no relation to any 
sales activity conducted in that state. We believe 
that on no reasonable basis can the gross receipts 
provision of the statute be deemed to intend such 
a result. 
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2. The sales were negotiated or effected in be-
half of Kennecott by agents or agencies 
chiefly situated at, connected with or sent 
out from premises for the transaction of busi-
ness rented by Kennecott outside of Utah. 
The decision of the Commission9 moreover, can 
not be sustained on any proper interpretation of the 
initial provisions of the "except" clause of the gross 
receipts factor, even if the last clause be disregarded. 
The Commission held that sales of copper and 
molybdenite sold without the State, through the 
Sales Corporation, do not fall within the statutory 
exception language and so are to be attributed to 
Utah. This is because, in the view of the Commis-
sion, such sales were not made in behalf of Kenne-
cott by "agents or agencies" of Kennecott within 
the meaning of the statute and, even if so made, such 
"agents or agencies" were not "chief ly. situated at, 
connected with or sent out from premises . . , oAvned 
or rented" by Kennecott. 
The sales were made in behalf of Kenne-
cott by agents or agencies of Kennecott. 
There can be no real contention that the Sales 
Corporation was not an "agent or agency" of Ken-
necott, The Eestatement of the Law, Agency lists 
the following as the three essential characteristics 
of an agency relationship: 
§12. Agent as Holder of a Power/ '~v-
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An agent or apparent agent holds a power to 
alter the legal relations between the principal and 
third persons and between the principal and him-
self. 
§13. Agent as a Fiduciary. 
An agent is a fiduciary with respect to mat-
ters within the scope of his agency. 
§14. Control by Principal. 
A principal has the right to control the con-
duct of the agent with respect to matters en-
trusted to him. 
Unquestionably these characteristics are found 
in the arrangements between Kennecott and the 
Sales Corporation. Under its agreement with Ken-
necott, the Sales Corporation had power to effect a 
transfer of title in minerals from Kennecott to 
third parties—to divest its principal of its interest 
in its goods. The Sales Corporation had the power 
to bind Kennecott by contracts and create liability 
to third persons thereunder. It had the power to 
acquire commissions by effecting sales. 
The fiduciary nature of the relationship in-
cludes the duty to account for profits arising out 
of the employment, the duty not to act adversely to 
the principal's interest, and the duty not to compete 
with the principal on the agent's own account or for 
another in agency matters. All these duties were 
explicit or implicit in the relationship between Ken-
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Trans. 
necott and the Sales Corporation. It was explicitly 
171,187, required to collect and remit to Kennecott net pro-
650,651, ceeds (after expenses and commissions) and to 
653, 662 account therefor. It was required to sell at the high-
est price obtainable. 
The Sales Corporation was subject to the direc-
tion, supervision and control of the officials of 
Kennecott and was under standing orders to get 
616 instructions in the event of unusual conditions. 
Finally, the parties clearly contemplated an 
168 agency relationship. The Sales Corporation was 
designated as Kennecott's agent and it was agreed 
that all sales should be made by the Sales Corpo-
ration "solely as sales agent" for Kennecott. 
It is clear from the foregoing that the Sales 
Corporation was an "agent" of Kennecott within 
any recognized or normal definition of that term. 
The fact is that the Commission itself recognized 
that, in making sales for Kennecott, the Sales Corpo-
ration acted as Kennecott's agent. The position of 
the Commission, however, is that such corporation 
was a special type of agent which it characterized as 
a "commission merchant" or "factor" and by reason 
of this fact cannot be regarded as an "agent" or 
"agency" within the meaning of the apportionment 
statute. This position is asserted by the Commis-
sion despite the fact that the words "agents" and 
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"agencies" are used without qualification in the 
statute and there nowhere appears therein any 
intent to exclude any particular types of agents. 
That "commission merchants" and "factors" are 
"agents" is perfectly clear in the law. 22 Am. Jur., 
Factors § § 1, 2. A factor is both an agent and a 
bailee since one of the distinguishing characteristics 
of this type of agency relationship is that the factor 
is entrusted with the possession of the property. 
22 Am. Jur., Factors §§ 2, 3. The factor, like any 
other agent, has the powder to alter the legal rela-
tions between the principal and third persons and 
between the principal and himself, is in a fiduciary 
relationship to his principal, and must obey instruc-
tions from his principal. 22 Am. Jur., Factors §§ 
"3, 14, 20, 22, 50. The Restatement of the Law, 
Agency summarizes the meaning of the word as 
follows (§ 1(d)): 
" 'Agent' is a word used to describe a person 
authorized by another to act on his account and 
under his control. Included within its meaining 
are both those who, whether or not servants as 
described in § 2, act in business dealings and those 
who, being servants, perform manual labor. An 
agent may be one who, to distinguish him from a 
servant in determining the liability of the princi-
pal, is called an independent contractor. Thus, the 
attorney at law, the broker, the factor, the auc-
tioneer, and other similar persons employed either 
for a single transaction or for a series of trans-
actions are agents, although, as to their physical 
activities, they are independent contractors." 
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Finally, the use in the apportionment section 
of the Utah statute of the word "agencies" in addi-
tion to the word "agent" clearly evidences a statu-
tory intent to broaden the coverage rather than to 
restrict it to only certain types of agents. "Agency" 
is defined in Webster's New International Diction-
ary (2d ed. 1951) as an "instrumentality" and as an 
"office or function of an agent, or factor." The word 
is not limited to an individual, but clearly includes 
a corporation or other organization or entity acting 
in such capacity. In no place in the statute is the 
intention evidenced that the language be confined to 
the relationship of an employee or servant. 
Moreover, even if such a narrow interpretation 
of the statute were warranted, the decision was 
incorrect on the facts. The relationship between 
Kennecott and the Sales Corporation, contrary to 
the finding of the Commission, was not one which 
would justify a holding that there existed such inde-
pendence from control of or lack of control by Ken-
necott as to support a finding that it was a "factor 
or commission merchant" as those terms are custo-
marily used. The Sales Corporation never obtained 
possession of the products sold, possession remain-
ing either in Kennecott or A. S. & K. on Kennecott's 
behalf. It sold as "agent" for Kennecott's account, 
not as principal. Kennecott constantly supervised 
the activities of the Sales Corporation and there was 
a standing instruction that if anything unusual 
should occur the Kennecott officials were to be con-
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\V.suI{e3"beifpfe any action was taken with regard to 
616 sales matters. The Sales Corporation did not sell 
. for any producer other than Kennecott or its sub-
sidiaries and did not hold itself out generally to 
other persons or companies as engaging in such 
business activities. The Sales Corporation did not 
650 guarantee the credit of customers. 
In considering this question it should also not 
be overlooked that the Sales Corporation is a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Kennecott, organized by Ken-
necott solely for the purpose of selling Kennecott's 
own products, that its employees were hired by 
Kennecott and assigned to duties (either full or 
-•'••TSifc" ; part-time) with the Sales Corporation, and that the 
••52(2), majority of the directors and officers of the Sales 
1
 616 Corporation were officers or employees of Kenne-
" cott. For the purpose of the Utah. Franchise Tax as 
applied to a unitary business such as this, the mere 
fact that the Sales Corporation exists as a separate 
- legal entity is not significant, rather its activities 
as they affect the Utah Copper Division should be 
taken into account to the same extent as though it 
were simply a division of Kennecott. For that pur-
pose, the separate corporate entity of the Sales 
Corporation may in effect properly be disregarded. 
- Cf. Centmont Corporationv. Marsch, 68 F . 2d 460; 
•K Bishop v. U.-S., 16 F . 2d 410; Chicago M & St. P. 
Ey. Co. v* Minneapolis, etc., Assn., 247 U. S. 490, 
38 S. Ct. 553, 62 L, ad. 1229; In re Kentucky Wagon 
Mfg. Go i r 3 F. Supp. 958, (Af t 71 F . 2d 802, Cert. 
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den. 293 U. S. 612); Darling Stores Corporation v. 
Young Realty Co., 121 F. 2d 112 (CCA 8 ) ; Detroit 
Motor Appliance Co. v. General Motors Corpora-
tion, 5 F. Supp. 27; Pacific Can Co. y. Hewes, 95 F. 
2d 42 (CCA 9) ; Western Securities Co. v. Spiro, 62 
Utah 623, 221 P. 856. 
The evidence in the record clearly shows that 
the operations of Kennecott and the Sales Corpo-
ration in the production and sale of copper and 
molybdenite, from the removal of the ore from the 
ground, through its milling, smelting and refining 
processes and to and including the sale of the ulti-
mate product to consumers, constitute a single uni-
tary enterprise, the purpose of which is the realiza-
tion of profit from the combined operations. In 
such case, for franchise tax purposes to treat the 
activities of the Sales Corporation as those of an 
independent factor acting on its own behalf is to 
disregard the essential economic facts of the case 
as well as the actual relations between the parties. 
This thought is well expressed in the statement of 
the California Supreme Court in Edison California 
Stores v. McColgan, 176 P. 2d 697 (aff. on rehearing, 
183 P. 2d 16 (1947), where the Court stated, at p. 
701: 
"In the present case all of the elements of a 
unitary business are present—unity of ownership, 
unity of operation by centralized purchasing, 
management, advertising and accounting, and 
unity of use in the centralized executive force 
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and general system of operation. The business of 
the parent and all of its subsidiaries is owned and 
managed under one centralized system, to the 
same extent as in the Butler Brothers case and 
other cases considered therein. Thus the business 
is unitary regardless of the fact that in the Butler 
Brothers case there was but one corporation 
involved, owning as parts of the unitary system 
seven different branches in as many states, and 
that in the present case there is a parent corpo-
ration owning and controlling as units of one 
system fifteen different branches organized as 
corporations in as many states. No difference in 
principle is discernible. If the crux of the matter 
is to ascertain that portion of the business which 
is done within this state, then the same considera-
tions justify the use of the formula allocation 
method in the one case as in the other." 
In assigning the sales to Utah because it found 
the Sales Corporation to be a "commission merchant 
or factor," the Commission relied upon cases which 
clearly do not support its position and, in fact, 
actually support Kennecott's contention. 
The first case cited by the Commission, Com-
monwealth v. Bayuk Cigars, Inc., 345 Pa. 348, 28 A. 
2d 134 (1942), affd per curiam, 318 U. S. 746, 87 
L. ed. 1123 (1943), involved sales negotiated outside 
of Pennsylvania by salesmen whose selling activities 
were performed in other jurisdictions, but the serv-
ices of these men were supervised, directed and con-
trolled by the home office in Pennsylvania, The 
corporation had no offices owned or rented outside 
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of Pennsylvania from which these men were 
assigned or from which they could receive their 
compensation. Under a Pennsylvania statute simi-
lar to that involved in the present case, the court 
attributed the gross receipts from such sales to 
Pennsylvania because the salesmen were working 
out of the Pennsylvania office and not out of any 
offices outside Pennsylvania. Kennecott has no 
quarrel with this decision. Indeed, although the 
facts are distinct from the present case, the obvious 
rationale of the case supports Kenneeott's position. 
The sales were to be assigned to the head office of 
the corporation from which the selling activities 
were directed and controlled and to which those 
making the sales were responsible. 
The Commission states in its opinion that it is 
well settled that companies marketing their prod-
ucts outside of the state of production through the 
medium of independent factors or commission mer-
chants are not doing business for tax purposes out-
side the state of production so as to be entitled to an 
apportionment of income within and without the 
state on account of such out-of-state sales. In its 
support, the Commission cites a comment by the 
Supreme Court of California in Irvine Co. v. Mc-
Colgan, 26 Cal. 2d 160, 157 P. 2d 847 (1945) to the 
effect that the reason is that factors or commission 
merchants are independent contractors engaged in 
their own business rather than the business of their 
principals. The decision of the Court in the Irvine 
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Co. case was predicated upon the fact that the corpo-
ration had its only office and place of business in 
California and marketed the greater portion of its 
products out of California through what were held 
to be commission merchants or factors. The Court 
did not even reach the question of the allocation 
formula because it decided that the entire business 
of the taxpayer was done within California and, in 
such event, the statute provided that the tax should 
be measured by its entire net income. 
Actually, all the comment relied upon by the 
Commission says is that, if a factor markets a 
corporation's products in a state, the corporation is 
not thereby doing business in such state. It does 
not say, and manifestly does not intend to say, that 
there may not be other circumstances and condi-
tions which would constitute doing business by the 
corporation in that or in other states. Where the 
corporation's only office and place of business is in 
the state where its products are produced and the 
factor has its authority from and responsibility to 
that office the sales will be attributable to such 
office in the state of production. But it follows from 
this reasoning that if the corporation has an office 
and place of business without the state of produc-
tion, the sales made by a factor having its authority 
from and responsibility to such office are to be 
assigned to that out-of-state office. The question is 
as to the office or place of business with which the 
48 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
factor, commission merchant or other agent or 
agency is connected. It is that which determines 
where the sales should be assigned. 
The vital distinction between the Irvine Co. case 
and the present case is that there the taxpayer's 
entire activities were confined to the taxing (pro-
ducing) state while, in this case, even though the 
Sales Corporation be considered a commission mer-
chant or factor, Kennecott admittedly was perma-
nently and substantially engaged in business outside 
of Utah, its principal offices being in New York 
City, and conducted its own sales activities and 
directed and supervised those of its agents from 
such out-of-state office. All sales were connected 
with and attributable to those offices and in no 
sense to any office in Utah. 
Where the corporation is engaged in business 
outside of the producing state, allocation of income 
is necessary; and, even assuming the commission 
merchant's or factor's activities are to be ignored 
(which we do not concede), the gross receipts from 
sales are to be attributed to the state in which is 
located the taxpayer's office with which such selling 
activities are connected. In other words, the offi-
cers and employees of the taxpayer who entered into 
the contract or arrangements with the commission 
merchant or factor, and who exercise supervision 
over such contract and the activities of such agent 
(as in this case), actually negotiate or effect the 
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sales in behalf of the taxpayer insofar as the sales 
factor is concerned. It is the income from the 
taxpayer's activities that is being allocated. Con-
sequently, in such a case the taxpayer's activities, 
sales-wise, should be given effect in the assignment 
of sales if those of the agent are disregarded. 
Similarly, in all of the other cases cited by the 
Commission the sales activities of the taxpayer— 
namely, the conduct and supervision of the sales 
arrangements and the continuing relationship with 
the commission merchant or factor there involved— 
took place in the taxing state. 
To illustrate, Commonwealth v. Minds Coal Min-
ing Corporation, 360 Pa. 7, 60 A. 2d 14 (1948), in-
volved a West Virginia corporation which owned and 
operated a coal mine in West Virginia and maintained 
its only executive and administrative office in Penn-
sylvania. The taxpayer had a contract with Bulah 
Coal Mining Corporation whereby Bulah acted as 
sales agent for the taxpayer. Bulah maintained its 
own offices in New York and had its own salesmen. 
It agreed to observe certain price limitations and 
Federal regulations, make contracts with pur-
chasers, invoice all shipments of coal direct to the 
customer, collect for sales and assume the credit 
risk. Orders for coal were forwarded by Bulah 
to the West Virginia mines where the coal was 
loaded to fill the orders. The Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania held that Bulah, as a result of a con-
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tract, became the sales agent and authorized repre-
sentative of the taxpayer for the sale of its coal; 
and that the sales negotiated and effected by Bulah 
were not by agents or agencies chiefly situate at, 
connected with, or sent out from premises for the 
transaction of business maintained by the taxpayer 
outside the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. They 
held, in consequence, that the gross receipts from 
the sales of coal sold by Bulah were to be assigned 
to Pennsylvania. 
In this case, as in the others cited by the Com-
mission, the taxpayer itself maintained no execu-
tive or sales office outside the state asserting the 
tax, its principal office was within the taxing state, 
and all of its own activities with respect to sales 
occurred within the taxing state. Accordingly, these 
cases offer no support for the Commission's assign-
ment of the sales in this case to Utah. In fact, upon 
analysis, they constitute direct support for Kenne-
cott's position. 
Moreover, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 
the Minds case specifically held in its conclusions of 
law that the sales involved were not effected in and 
should not be assigned to West Virginia, the state 
of production, the taxpayer having argued to that 
effect. Thus we have in that case the situation where 
the taxpayer mines its product in one state, main-
tains its executive and administrative headquarters 
in the second state, and sells its product through a 
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commission merchant or factor in a third state 
which is not the state of production. Under the 
Court's decision in that case the gross receipts from 
sales were assigned not to the state of production 
but to the state where the executive and administra-
tive offices were maintained. We have in substance 
the same situation in the present case: Kennecott 
mines in one state, maintains its executive and 
administrative offices in a second state, and (assum-
ing arguendo that the Sales Corporation is a "fac-
tor") sells its products through a factor in the 
second state, but not in the state of production. It 
is strikingly clear that, under the Minds decision, 
the gross receipts from sales should be assigned 
to the state where the executive offices are main-
tained, and not to the state of production. 
The Minds case also demonstrates the inequit-
able and incorrect nature of the Commission's deci-
sion in this proceeding. If the Commission's theory 
in this case were followed, in every case in which a 
"commission merchant" or "factor" is used for sell-
ing activity, every state in which the taxpayer did 
any business related to the product sold might claim 
that all of the gross receipts from sales are attrib-
utable to it. Thus, if the case stood for the proposi-
tion advanced by the Commission, in that same case 
West Virginia could have assigned all of the sales 
to itself, as the state of production, on the basis of 
the same argument. And, if the taxpayer had also 
fabricated the product in another state, that state 
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could on similar reasoning assign Ml ;of the gross 
receipts to itself. In other words, sales effected 
through a factor could under such a theory be as-
signed in full to every state in which a (Corporation 
is taxed because (according to the interpretation 
advanced by the Commission) such sales will not 
have been "negotiated or effected in behalf of the 
corporation by agents or agencies chiefly situated at, 
connected with, or sent out from premises for the 
transaction of business owned or rented by the 
corporation" in any jurisdiction. 
It is clear that the Legislature of Utah did not 
intend that its statute operate in any such inequita-
ble and unreasonable manner. In the California 
Packing case this Court stated (93 P. 2d at 468, 
97 Utah 377): "There is also apparent a purpose 
to avoid double taxation." 
. Finally, the Commission in its decision seems 
to have adopted just as unrealistic an interpretation 
and application of the words "in behalf of the corpo-
ration" in the "except" clause in the gross receipts 
factor, stating that sales were effected by the Sales 
Corporation acting in its own behalf. And this, des-
pite the statement in the same sentence that such 
sales' were for the account of Kennecott. Of course, 
every agent acts-in his own behalf in* the sense that 
he performs the -activity:" or function and does so to 
obtains compensation.:: But to state- that,: within the 
meaning of the:""except", clause,, sales ofKennecott 's 
S3 
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property by the Sales Corporation, as to which it 
had to account to Kennecott for the proceeds less 
expenses and commissions and was subject to the 
direction and control of Kennecott, were made on 
behalf of the Sales Corporation and not on behalf 
of Kennecott would render the "except" clause 
meaningless and inapplicable in any situation. 
The sales were negotiated or effected by 
agents or agencies "chiefly situated at, 
connected with or sent out from prem-
ises" rented by Kennecott outside of 
Utah. 
The Commission has also erroneously inter-
preted and applied the "premises" provision of the 
"except" clause of the gross receipts factor by hold-
ing, in effect, that the statutory provision was not 
met since the sales were negotiated and effected 
by employees of the Sales Corporation out of offices 
owned or rented by it and not out of offices owned 
or rented by Kennecott. In so doing the Commission 
not only failed to give effect to the language of that 
clause, but also acted upon an erroneous interpre-
tation of the facts. 
The "except" clause excludes from sales to be 
attributed to Utah those made by agents or agencies 
"chiefly situated at, connected with or sent out from 
premises for the transaction of business owned or 
rented by the corporation outside the state." 
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Trans. 
As is perfectly clear, the language of the statute 
is in the alternative—the agents can be either chiefly 
situated at, or sent out from premises rented by 
Kennecott, or they can be "connected with" such 
premises. The vital consideration, and that which the 
statute attempts to cover, is obviously whether in 
fact the taxpayer regularly maintains offices and 
conducts a portion of its business outside of the 
State of Utah and whether the sales activities of the 
taxpayer are related to such office rather than to 
its operations in Utah. 
It is undisputed that in this case all sales activi-
ties were performed outside of Utah and had no con-
nection with any offices or places of business main-
tained by Kennecott or its agents within the State 
of Utah. 
As clearly appears from the testimony, it is 
essential in the business in which Kennecott is en-
gaged that its sales activities be centralized in and 
68-9, conducted from offices on the eastern seaboard. This 
L78 is equally true of its competitors. Ready access to 
buyers, market data, markets and the like on the 
part of its executive officers and sales representa-
tives have required and continue to require their 
location in New York City. The location of all sales 
activities outside of Utah results from hard eco-
nomic facts. No contention can be made, nor is one 
made as we understand the position of the Com-
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mission, that the New York office of Kennecott was 
not a bona fide and permanent office outside the 
State of Utah and that all of Kennecott's sales 
activities were not effected and directed from that 
office. 
145, 616, The record is replete with evidence of the direct 
618, 623, and continuing supervision of the sales activities of 
629, the Sales Corporation by Kennecott's own officers 
674-5 and employees. Constant contact was maintained 
by Kennecott's officers with respect to the sales 
activities of its agent and major sales policies were 
determined by Kennecott's officers and transmitted 
to the agent. The scheduling of production as re-
lated to sales, the supervision of accounting with 
respect to proceeds of sales, and other important 
matters required the constant consideration and 
attention of Kennecott's officers and employees. All 
of this supervision, direction and other sales activi-
ties on the part of Kennecott took place or emanated 
from its New York office,—none occurred in Utah. 
With these facts admitted, it is unrealistic to 
attribute the entire gross receipts from the sales 
so consummated to Utah on technical considerations 
of occupancy of identical office space. Under no 
reasonable interpretation of the statute can it be 
said that the activities of Kennecott's agent—the 
Sales Corporation—were not "connected with" a 
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permanent place of business owned or rented by 
Kennecott outside of the State of Utah or that the 
sales were not "attributable" to such premises. 
Moreover, the offices occupied by the Sales 
Corporation's employees were located on the same 
Ex. floors of the same building in New York City as 
41(2), those occupied by Kennecott's officers and employ-
42(2) ees, which premises were rented by Kennecott from 
575 the building owner. Most of the officers and em-
et seq. ployees of the Sales Corporation were also officers 
and employees of Kennecott. The office space made 
available by Kennecott to the Sales Corporation 
was only a part, and in general not a segregated 
part, of the space rented by Kennecott from the 
F. 63, owner of the building. The Commission itself found 
Ex. that the premises of Kennecott and the Sales Corpo-
52(2) ration were "joint offices and premises". Account-
r. 576, ing, shipping billing, collecting, purchasing, legal, 
381-2, telephone and cable and similar services were furn-
1,613, ished to the Sales Corporation by Kennecott's 
.6, 631 employees, the Sales Corporation being charged by 
st seq. Kennecott for its appropriate portion of the cost of 
such services. Admitting all this, the Commission 
insists that the Sales Corporation was not "situated 
at, connected with or sent out from" premises of 
Kennecott merely because, among many other salary 
and expense items originally paid by Kennecott and 
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Ex. then allocated among the departments involved, 
.48(2) including the Sales Corporation, was an amount 
582 with respect to "rent". Even this item admittedly 
et seq., was not a fixed charge for any definite space but 
590 an indirect allocated charge. 
The foregoing we believe suffices to indicate 
the nature of the Commission's action on this point 
and we will not seek to extend this brief unduly to 
discuss in greater detail the evidence on this point. 
We do not believe that the incidence of the tax can 
be deemed to be dependent on such a theoretical and 
minor point as that advanced by the Commission. 
As illustrative of the lack of substance or reasonable 
basis for the Commission's decision on this point, it 
is interesting to speculate as to what its decision 
would have been had the building in which Kennecott 
and the Sales Corporation maintained their joint 
offices been owned by Kennecott rather than space 
therein leased from an outside owner. In such case, 
the space occupied by the employees of the Sales 
Corporation would have been in premises "owned" 
by Kennecott. 
As the foregoing discussion of the Commission's 
contentions with respect to the "agency" and "prem-
ises" sections of the gross receipt factor demon-
strates, the Commission does not give effect to the 
actual wording of the statute but rather applies it 
as if it read as follows (additions in italics and 
omissions in brackets): 
58 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"(1st) Sales, except those negotiated or 
effected in behalf of the corporation in its name 
by agents or agencies other than factors or com-
mission agents chiefly situated at, [connected 
with] or sent out from premises for the trans-
action of business owned or rented by the corpo-
ration outside this state and for the use or occu-
pancy of which the selling agent or agency pays 
to the corporation no rent or rental charge . . . ." 
3. Until 1951 the Commission had concurred in 
assigning to business carried on outside Utah 
the gross receipts from sales of the Utah 
Copper Division's mineral products. This 
long-standing administrative construction and 
application of the apportionment statute 
should be controlling. 
Even if there had initially been a question as to 
the interpretation of the gross receipts factor of 
the apportionment statute, the Commission's own 
long-standing interpretation and application thereof 
so as to exclude gross receipts from sales of the 
Utah Copper Division's products should now be 
followed. 
From the passage of the Franchise Tax Act in 
1931 until 1951, the Commission, in applying 
the statutory apportionment formula, consistently 
assigned to business carried on outside of Utah 
100% of the gross receipts from sales of mineral 
-7 products of the Utah Copper Division. 
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The nature and purpose of the Sales Corpora-
"'''l".^ "'ti6 '^si^ c.e..ij£s organization in 1933 as the sales agent 
~: of'Kennecott had been well known by the Commis-
sion. In full knowledge of the facts, for 1941 and 
prior years the Commission had consistently applied 
. ; the statutory formula and assigned all sales of 
-
 ; inineral-products outside the State. For 1942 and 
• , subsequent years, .Kennecott filed its returns on 
the basis here contended for by Kennecott. When 
the Commission on March 10, 1945 applied an alge-
braic formula as to the computation of the depletion 
deduction with respect to 1942, it again conceded 
the propriety of Kenneeott's assigning 100% of 
sales to business carried on outside of Utah. When 
the depletion issue for that year came to this Court, 
Kennecott Copper Corporation v. State Tax Com-
mission, supra, the Commission likewise conceded 
the propriety of such assignment of sales by Kenne-
cott and this Court concurred accordingly. 
I t was not until 1951 that the Commission in any 
way departed or indicated any intent to depart from 
its former practice and it was not until 1952, during 
the course of the hearings in this case, that the Com-
mission applied the allocation formula so as to 
1
 ; assign to Utah gross receipts from sales of mineral 
;•.> products. 
Even if there were doubt as to the proper inter-
pre ta t ion and application of the statute (and Ken-
necott submits tllat there is no reasonable doubt as 
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to the correctness of its contentions), such a long 
and consistent administrative construction of the 
statutory provision by the public agency charged 
with its administration should control. 
C. The apportionment statute, as construed and 
applied by the State Tax Commission, would uncon-
stitutionally tax income from activities beyond 
the jurisdiction of Utah and would unduly burden 
interstate commerce. 
Since, under what we regard as the proper con-
struction of the statute, the result in this case is to 
eliminate from the numerator of the gross receipts 
factor of the apportionment statute, the gross re-
ceipts from sales made outside of Utah, there is no 
necessity for this Court to pass upon the constitu-
tional questions involved under either the Federal 
or the Utah Constitution. 
Under established principles of judicial con-
struction, the statute should be construed so as to 
avoid serious doubts as to its constitutionality. If 
the statute were to be applied in the manner deter-
mined by the Commission, it would result in taxing 
income not attributable to business activities carried 
on within the jurisdiction of Utah and would thus 
deprive Kennecott of due process of law within the 
meaning of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States and 
Section 7 of Article I of the Constitution of Utah 
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and would likewise unduly burden interstate com-
merce in violation of Section 8 of Article I of the 
Federal Constitution. 
It has long been settled by the Supreme Court 
of the United States that a state cannot tax income 
from activities done or income earned without its 
jurisdiction and that an apportionment formula, 
however valid on its face, is invalid if, as applied to 
the facts, it results in the allocation of an unreason-
able or arbitrary amount of income to the taxing 
jurisdiction. 
Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 
254 IT. S. 113, 65 L. ed. 165, (1920); 
Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax 
Commission, 266 U. S. 271, 69 L. ed. 283, 
(1924); 
Hans Bees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 
U. S. 123, 51 S. Ct. 385, 75 L. ed. 879, (1931); 
Butler Brothers v. McColgan, 315 U. S. 501, 
62 S. Ct. 701, 86 L. ed. 991, (1942). 
In the Hans Rees' case, discussed above, the 
Supreme Court held invalid a North Carolina tax 
based upon net income because the apportionment 
formula as applied to the particular facts operated 
to tax profits not attributable to transactions within 
its jurisdiction. Net income was assigned to North 
Carolina in the ratio that the value of real and per-
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sonal property in that state bore to the value of all 
such property. The taxpayer, a New York corpo-
ration, was engaged in the business of tanning, 
manufacturing and selling belting and other heavy 
leathers. Its manufacturing plant was located in 
North Carolina and it conducted its business upon 
both wholesale and retail levels. Its wholesale busi-
ness consisted of selling hides to shoe manufacturers 
in carload lots and the retail business consisted of 
cutting the hides into innumerable pieces, finishing 
it in various ways, and selling it in less than car-
load lots. A warehouse was located in New York 
from which shipments were made from stock on hand 
to various customers. When the merchandise re-
quired by a customer was not on hand in the New 
York warehouse, it was shipped from North Caro-
lina either to the New York warehouse or direct to 
the customer. The sales office was located in New 
York and the salesmen reported to that office, sales 
being made throughout the United States, including 
North Carolina, and abroad. Certain finishing work 
was done in New York. Between 40% and 50% of 
the output of the North Carolina plant was shipped 
to New York, the remainder being shipped directly 
to the customers on orders from New York. 
The income allocated to North Carolina pur-
suant to its statutory method for the years involved 
was in excess of 83%, 84%, 66% and 85%, respec-
tively. The Supreme Court of North Carolina had 
upheld the statute as being not invalid on its face. 
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But the Supreme Court of the United States held 
the statute as applied invalid, stating (283 U. S. at 
pp. 134-136): 
"When, as in this case, there are different 
taxing jurisdictions, each competent to lay a tax 
with respect to what lies within, and is done with-
in, its own borders, and the question is necessarily 
one of apportionment, evidence may always be 
received which tends to show that a State has 
applied a method, which, albeit fair on its face, 
operated so as to reach profits which are in no 
just sense attributable to transactions within its. 
jurisdiction. 
* # * 
"For the present purpose, in determining the 
validity of the statutory method as applied to the 
appellant, it is not necessary to review the evi-
dence in detail, or to determine as a matter of 
fact the precise par t of the income which should 
be regarded as attributable to the business con-
ducted in North Carolina. It is sufficient to say 
that, in any aspect of the evidence, and upon the 
assumption made by the state court with respect 
to the facts shown, the statutory method, as 
applied to the appellant's business for the years 
in question operated unreasonably and arbitrarily, 
in attributing to North Carolina a percentage of 
income out of all appropriate proportion to the 
business transacted by the appellant in that State. 
In this view, the taxes as laid were beyond the 
State's authority." 
The Hans Rees' case has been discussed in detail 
because it is strikingly analogous to the present 
case, each being a situation where a review of the 
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facts and the results of the application of the appor-
tionment statute by the tax authorities immediately 
disclose an unreasonable and arbitrary allocation of 
net income to the taxing jurisdiction. As pointed out 
previously, the Hans Bees' case involved only a 
single factor apportionment formula. However, in 
the instant case, the interpretation accorded the 
gross receipts factor by the Commission, in effect, 
substantially reads it out of the statute and thus 
attributes to Utah income in fact earned in other 
states. 
The following, among other cases, evidence the 
restrictions upon state taxation of income or prop-
erty without its borders and upon burdening inter-
state commerce. 
Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 
268 U. S. 203, 69 L. ed. 916 (1925); 
J. D. Adams Manufacturing Co. v. Storen, 304 
U. S. 307, 82 L. ed. 1365 (1938); 
Gwinn, White & Prince v. Henneford, 305 U. S. 
434, 83 L.ed. 272 (1939); 
McLeod v. Dilworth Co., 322 U. S. 327, 88 L. 
ed. 1304 (1944); 
Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 91 L. ed. 265 
(1946); 
Joseph v. Carter and Weekes Stevedoring Co., 
330 U. S. 422, 91 L. ed. 993 (1946); 
Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. State Tax 
Commission, 334 II. S. 653, 92 L. ed. 1633 
(1948). 
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Moreover, it is clear that the invalidity of the 
Utah tax, if applied as has been done by the Com-
mission so as to tax Kennecott's activities beyond 
its jurisdiction, is not dependent upon taxation in 
fact in any other state or the basis or amount there-
of. Such factors are entirely irrelevant. As stated 
in Freeman v. Hewit, supra, (pp. 256-57): 
"It is suggested, however, that the validity 
of a gross sales tax should depend on whether 
another State has also sought to impose its bur-
den on the transactions. If another State has 
taxed the same interstate transaction, the burden-
some consequences to interstate trade are undeni-
able. But that, for the time being, only one State 
has taxed is irrelevant to the kind of freedom of 
trade which the Commerce Clause generated. The 
immunities implicit in the Commerce Clause and 
the potential taxing power of a State can hardly 
be made to depend, in the world of practical af-
fairs, on the shifting incidence of the varying tax 
laws of the various States at a particular 
moment." 
And in Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Tax Com-
mission, supra, the Supreme Court said (p. 663): 
«* # # £] v e n if neither Pennsylvania nor New 
Jersey sought to tax their proportionate share 
of the revenue from this transportation, such 
abstention would not justify the tax by New York 
of the entire revenue." 
The Supreme Court of the United States has 
but recently reaffirmed that state taxation is not 
unrestricted. Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Con-
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ner, 340 U. S. 602, 71 S. Ct. 508, 95 L. ed. 573 (1951). 
Consequently, if the obvious intent of the UtaJi 
apportionment statute and the plain meaning of its 
specific provisions are ignored and contravened, as 
in the decision of the Commission attributing to 
Utah sales having no relation thereto, constitutional 
invalidity will result. 
II. 
Point 
In computing percentage depletion with respect to 
the Utah Copper Division, the statutory term "net 
income from the property" means the gross receipts 
from the sale of products less only costs and expenses. 
The second basic issue in this case concerns the 
amount of the deduction from gross income to be 
made for depletion in computing the net income of 
the Utah Copper Division for franchise tax pur-
poses. 
Under the Utah Franchise Tax statute, the net 
income, to be apportioned within and without Utah 
in accordance with the apportionment formula dis-
cussed in Point I of this Brief, is to be determined 
by deducting from its gross income the several 
deductions specified in Section 80-13-8 (Sec. 59-13-7 
Utah Code 1953) of the statute. The gross income 
from which such deductions are to be made is the 
total gross income resulting from operations both 
within and without the State; similarly, the deduc-
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tions specified are those applicable to the business 
done both within and without the State. Such deduc-
tions, to be made before apportionment of net 
income, include "in the case of mines . . . a reason-
able allowance for depletion." The section then 
provides: 
"Percentage allowance for depletion. 
(b) The allowance for depletion shall be 
thirty-three and one-third percent of the net in-
come from the property during the taxable year, 
computed without allowance for depletion or on 
the basis provided in Sub-section (9) (a) as the 
taxpayer may elect." 
Since Kennecott elected to use the percentage 
method of computing the allowance for depletion, 
the only question here involved is as to the proper 
construction and application, under the facts of this 
case, of the foregoing provision for percentage 
depletion, and in particular the words "net income 
from the property." 
As more fully set forth above in this Brief (pp. 
4 to 14), the operations of Kennecott's Utah Cop-
per Division within and without the State of Utah 
146 constitute a continuous, indivisible and integrated 
operation, the single purpose of which is the pro-
duction and sale at a profit of mineral products. 
F. 12j During the years here in question, ore extraction 
131 and concentration were effected-by-Kennecott itself 
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at its mines and Arthur and Magna mills, located 
14,179 in Utah. At this point, the molybdenite concentrates 
and certain precipitates, aggregating but a small 
percentage of the total, were sold to customers out-
side of the State. 
In the case of all other metals, the remaining 
processes necessary to produce the marketable re-
fined metals, and all transportation related to such 
. 43 processes, were performed for Kennecott by others. 
Thus, practically all such concentrates coming from 
267-8 Kennecott's mills were smelted for Kennecott by 
A. S. & R., at its Garfield smelter in Utah, and 
practically all the blister copper resulting from the 
smelting was transported by common carriers to 
the refineries of A. S. & R. located in Maryland and 
216 New Jersey, where it was electrolytically refined and 
the copper, gold, silver, platinum and palladium, for 
Ex. the first time in marketable form, were obtained. 
ii(2), Such smelting and refining were i)erformed for 
T-. 20 Kennecott by A. S. & R., an independent company, 
), 226, for a negotiated fee on what may be termed a "cost 
100 plus" basis; that is, under a contract which provided 
for the reimbursement by Kennecott to A. S. & R. 
of specified costs incurred by it in processing Ken-
necott's products plus fixed amounts per ton to 
cover A. S. & R.'s overhead^ profit, taxes and other 
items not compensated for through the direct reim-
bursement of costs::.Thei'rarisp6rtati6ri of the blister 
• • copper f rom: the \ Gar field -Smelter- of AV-S; & R. to 
;:. •• the;.refineries: in ' the East was perfor-med* for Ken-
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necott by cofrimon carriers, entirely independent of 
Kennecott, at regular published tariff rates. Until 
sale after completion of the refining, all such prod-
171, 609 nets remained the property of Kennecott. 
With the minor exception mentioned above, it 
is admitted by both parties, and the Commission so 
found, that none of the production of Kennecott's 
mines or mills resulted in a commercially marketable 
409 product, and that there was no representative mar-
ket or field price, in Utah or elsewhere, for the 
P. 70 minerals in the crude form in which they came from 
Kennecott's mills. The copper, gold, silver, platinum 
and palladium were not in marketable form until 
43-4, after they had been smelted and electrolytically 
268,308 refined at refineries located outside of Utah. In 
the case of these products, it was only at this final 
point in the production process that any market for 
53 such metals existed. 
Kennecott contends that the term "net income 
from the property" in the percentage depletion pro-
vision means the gross receipis from the sale of the 
products of the Utah Copper Division, less all re-
lated expenses of mining, concentrating, smelting, 
refining, transportation and sale and also less 
Federal income taxes. 
The Commission takes the position that "net 
income from the property" means the gross receipts 
from the sale of such products, less such expenses 
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and income taxes, and also less a substantial portion 
of such net income which it deems to be attributable 
to what it terms the "post-mining" processes, 
namely, smelting, refining, transportation and sale. 
Under the Commission's decision, the amount of net 
income attributable respectively to the mining and 
post-mining processes as by it defined is deemed to 
be the portion thereof which the costs and expenses 
of each such class of processes bear to the total of 
282-3 such costs and expenses (including depletion). This 
position is taken by the Commission although it 
admits that processes beyond ore extraction and 
milling are required in order to obtain a marketable 
product, and that such additional processes were 
not conducted by Kennecott itself but were per-
F. 14 formed for it by independent parties. 
Under Kennecott's construction of the statute, 
the statutory allowance for depletion is obtained 
very simply by applying the factor of 33%% to the 
net income obtained by deducting from gross re-
ceipts all expenses (including income taxes) other 
than the depletion allowance itself. 
The Commission's position, however, requires 
the use of an algebraic formula, involving quad-
294 ratics. This is because (a) the allocation of net 
income ratably to costs (including depletion) re-
quired to determine the amount of depletion cannot 
be determined until the depletion deduction itself 
is determined, and (b) the amount of depletion, in 
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turn, depends on the allocation of net income. The 
use of this formula by the Commission resulted, for 
the period involved, in a depletion deduction which 
was not 33%% of total net income from mineral 
production before depletion (as provided by the 
statute), but was 33y3% of approximately 78% of 
such total net income. This 78% of total net income 
was the amount of such total net income which the 
application of the formula attributed to mining and 
concentrating processes. 
In support of its contention, Kennecott submits 
that (a) the language of the statute is clear and 
that the Commission's interpretation, requiring the 
use of an algebraic formula, is not only illogical and 
insupportable but cannot reasonably be deemed to 
have been intended by the Utah Legislature, (b) that 
the legislative history of the Utah percentage deple-
tion provision, as set forth in the testimony, is so 
specific and clear as to admit of no dispute as to its 
proper interpretation in the manner asserted by 
Kennecott, and (c) that the Commission's present 
construction of the statute is contrary to the admin-
istrative interpretation accorded it for many years 
following its enactment and also is contrary to the 
construction given by the Commission to other pro-
visions of the tax laws of Utah. 
A. The language of the statutory depletion provision 
is clear and supports Kennecott's contention. The 
Commission's use of an algebraic formula is unnec-
essary, contrary to the language of the statute 
and was not intended by the Legislature. 
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The language of the depletion provision sup-
ports Kennecott's position completely. The plain 
and natural meaning of the words is that "net in* 
corne from the property" means the actual receipts 
from sales of the products less all related costs, 
expenses and taxes. This is the ordinary and normal 
61-2 way of determining "net income", and permits of 
66-8 a ready and simple calculation of the depletion 
78-9 deduction. Nowhere does the statute even imply 
88 that this ordinary method of determining net income 
is to be departed from nor does it imply that, in a 
unitary operation such as Kennecott's, the term "net 
income" means only that portion of the ordinary net 
income deemed attributable to a part of the single 
business which has produced the income. As pointed 
out by the Court in New Park Mining Company v. 
State Tax Commission, 113 Utah 410, 196 P. 2d 485, 
the addition of the words "from the property" do 
not envisage some different method of computing 
net income than that ordinarily employed; on the 
contrary, they are intended only to relate the net 
income in question to that derived from the sale of 
the wasting asset, as distinct from income from 
other sources. There this Court said: 
"We note, also, the contention of plaintiffs 
that the phrase 'net income from the property 
during the taxable year' means something dif-
ferent from 'net income.' The theory upon which 
wasting assets corporations, such as mining com-
panies, are allowed a deduction for depletion, is 
that the corporation franchise tax, is a tax on 
income or upon the increment produced by capi-
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: tal, and not upon the capital itself. Hence, wast-
ing assets corporations are allowed a deduction 
for depletion on the theory that the taxpayer thus 
recoups its capital investment. But a wasting 
assets corporation may have income other than 
that derived from the sale of its capital. On such 
other income it is not entitled to a deduction for 
depletion. Hence in Section 80-13-8(9) (b) which 
provides for deduction for depletion, the words 
'net income' were qualified with the words 'from 
the property' so that wasting assets corporations 
would not be entitled to make a deduction for 
depletion from all income, from whatever source 
derived. The words are not ambiguous and do not 
create a separate concept or a separate kind of 
net income for tax purposes. They merely serve 
to indicate that deductions for depletion can be 
made only from that portion of the taxpayer's 
net income which is derived from sales of its 
capital assets." (Italics supplied.) 
The Commission, however, would construe the 
statute so as to require, in lieu of the simple and 
ordinary computation seemingly prescribed, an un-
realistic allocation of net income to what are but 
component parts of a continuous and unified process 
all of which are necessary to the production of 
marketable products. As a result, it would require 
the use of an elaborate algebraic formula in order 
to determine the amount of the depletion allowance 
provided by the statute. 
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Where a statute permits of a ready and simple 
method of calculation in accordance with ordinary 
accounting methods, it is obviously unreasonable to 
attribute to the Legislature which enacted it an intent 
to require an algebraic formula involving quadratics 
for the purpose of determining the deduction/ 
* The complicated nature of the formula is evident 
from the mere statement thereof made by Mr. C. 
W. Allison of the Commission's auditing division, 
in his letter to Kennecott : 
"Herewith is the formula which was used 
in arriving at the $6,455,813.78 allowable deple-
tion shown in Schedule No. 8 of our report 
dated March 10, 1945, in connection with your 
1942 Utah corporation franchise tax return. 
D2 + D(2TC + MC—TNI) — TNI • MC = 0 
3 3 
D = allowable percentage depletion. 
TC = total costs of mining, milling, concen-
trating, smelting, refining, trans-
porting, and selling the ore and ore 
products, before depletion. 
($62,619,791.58 per Schedule No. 8) 
MC = mining costs, including milling and 
concentrating costs, transportation 
of ore to mill, etc. before depletion. 
($40,991,515.78 per Schedule No. 8) 
TNI = total net income derived from ore 
products, before depletion, but after 
federal taxes 
($25,253,046.43 per Schedule No. 8) 
By making the appropriate substitutions and 
solving for 'D' the $6,455,813.78 figure is ar-
rived at. If any further information is desired, 
we shall be glad to furnish it." 
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In connection with a similar attempt to attrib-
ute to Congress the requirement of an analogous 
(although not nearly so complicated) algebraic com-
putation, in Edwards v. Slocum, 287 F. 651 (2d Cir. 
1923) the Court said (pp. 653-55): 
u
 . . . the taxpayer perceives that the 'net 
: estate,' which is practically synonymous with 
taxable estate, is to receive augmentation by an 
unknown amount, which renders its own figure 
unknown; but this baffles arithmetic, so he has 
recourse to an algebraic formula, which has 
played an unduly important part in the argu-
ments at bar. 
"We have treated this formula in a footnote; 
it is only legally important in that it has produced 
the argument that any method of taxation, or of 
working out taxes, that requires so much algebra, 
'must be wrong.' We need not go so far, but do 
hold that the presumption is that Congress in-
tended a simpler method — one that a plain man 
could understand. Algebraic formulae are not 
lightly to be imputed to legislators. 
* # « * 
" '.. . . . History, so far as we can discover, 
shows no other instance of attempting to measure 
a tax pro tanto by itself." 
76 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In this connection Mr. Henry B. Fernald* in 
his testimony in this case aptly pointed out this 
298 error in the position of the Commission, as follows : 
uThe statute of the State of Utah seems to 
me not to contemplate nor warrant the use of any 
such algebraic formula. I know of no taxing 
statute of any state which contemplates any such 
algebraic formula. It seems to violate all accepted 
standards of simplicity and comprehensibility in 
a taxing statute or in good tax practice." 
Furthermore, the Commission's position vio-
lates the specific statutory requirement that the 
allowance for depletion is to be 33%% of the net 
income from the property "computed without allow-
ance for depletion." In other words, the statute 
* Mr. Fernald is a nationally recognized authority 
in the fields of accounting and taxation, particu-
larly with respect to mining. He has been for many 
years a member of the Tax Committee of the 
United States Chamber of Commerce and has 
been a member of and is now Vice-Chairman of 
the Tax Committee of the International Chamber 
of Commerce. For many years he has been a mem-
ber of and the Chairman of the Tax Committee of 
the American Mining Congress. Since 1921 he has 
frequently appeared before legislative and admin-
istrative bodies in connection with tax legislation 
and has assisted in the drafting of proposed 
Federal tax legislation and regulations applicable 
to mining and other natural resource businesses. 
243 He has also had a broad experience for over 30 
t seq., years in state and municipal tax matters in both 
470 an advisory and administrative capacity. 
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specifically excludes depletion as a factor in com-
puting the net income upon which depletion is based. 
As previously stated, far from excluding such deple-
tion as such a factor, the Commission's method of 
computation by use of an algebraic formula neces-
sarily involves the use of the depletion deduction 
itself in determining the net income with respect to 
which depletion is computed. 
Moreover, the Commission has utilized illogical 
and insupportable reasoning in its theory that the 
net income of the Utah Copper Division can be 
attributed to each of the processes and activities 
carried on by the Utah Copper Division in direct 
proportion to the costs and expenses of each such 
process or activity. The simple answer to this part 
of the Commission's theory is that an allocation of 
income ratably to costs just does not make good 
287-8 sense. As Mr. Fernald testified: 
"The basic error in the method is its assump-
tion that income will arise ratably to costs. This 
would be true only in the case of 'cost-plus' con-
tracts where the amount to be received as income 
will be determined as a percentage of costs. It 
is not true when income receipts are determined 
by sales at competitive or fixed prices without 
regard to the costs involved in any particular 
case. In such case, the net income is what remains 
of the receipts after deduction of the costs, and 
the amount of the costs determines how much of 
the receipts will not constitute income. The gen-
eral principle in such a case is that the higher the 
costs the less the net income, and the lower the 
costs the greater the net income. 
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Trans. 
"The assumption of the Commission's method 
is directly contrary to this principle in that the 
method is based on an assumption that the greater 
the costs the greater the share of income alloca-
ble thereto, and the less the costs the less the 
share of income. 
"The mere statement of this fundamental 
error in the basis of this method should be suf-
ficient to show it is not a fair and reasonable 
method to be applied. The examples given merely 
serve to illustrate the unreasonable results such 
as come from the use of the essentially defective 
method." 
236-9 Mr. Seymour Wells* likewise testified: 
"In my opinion, this (the Commission's) 
method for computing depletion is wrong for 
several reasons. 
"The principal reason is that the formula is 
not based on any sound accounting principle. It 
is entirely a fiction to suppose that the total 
* Mr. Seymour Wells is a former president of the 
Utah Association of Certified Public Accountants 
with long experience in accounting and mining 
matters. From 1917 to 1924 he was a Federal 
internal revenue agent. In 1931 he was employed 
by the State of Utah to assist in drafting the cor-
poration franchise tax law. He also assisted in 
planning the accounting system and procedure 
for the newly organized State Tax Commission, 
231 in drafting forms for the returns, and the instruc-
et seq, tions with respect thereto. 
79 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
profits of the single business are divisible among 
the various stages of production according to 
their relative costs. The results obtained have no 
real meaning. Moreover, there is no reason for 
ascribing any profit at all to freight or to the 
other purchased services of smelting and refining. 
In my opinion, the entire profit is net income 
from the property as that term is generally under-
stood. * * * 
"Finally, I believe the-method of apportion-
ment of profits to various stages of production 
on the basis of relative costs is wrong because it 
gives a relatively greater profit to a high cost 
and less to a low cost. Under this method, if 
freight rates should go up and mine costs down, 
more profit would be assigned to freight and less 
to mining. This is unreasonable. * * * 
"As the product goes along the stages of pro-
duction, it accumulates costs, and the cost value 
increases, and finally it gets to the stage where 
it is sold, and there are many factors entering into 
what they get for it. It is based on supply and 
demand, and not cost of production solely; and 
there is no way of telling what the profit will be 
until that sale is arrived at. 
"Now this formula attempts, or according to 
the formula, it accumulates not only the costs but 
a proportion of the profit for the whole year. To 
do that it would have to know what the profit is, 
and second, what proportion each dollar of expen-
diture should have of the total. Of course, there 
is no such determination possible as that. It is 
nothing real. It is simply a fictitious arithmetical 
calculation without any meaning." 
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I t should be noted that the foregoing testimony 
of Mr. Fernald and Mr. Wells is in no way con-
tested by any testimony presented on behalf of the 
Commission. The Commission at no point in these 
hearings presented any testimony in support of the 
formula used by it in its method of allocating profits 
ratably to costs or of its construction of the statute. 
B. The Legislative history of the percentage deple-
tion provision of the Utah Statute clearly demon-
strates that the Legislature intended the compu-
tation to be made as Kennecott asserts. 
As shown above, the language of the percentage 
depletion provision provides no support for the 
devious and complicated calculation of depletion 
attempted by the Commission in this case; nor is it 
to be presumed that the Legislature in enacting the 
provision intended that it be applied in such a 
fashion. 
That the Legislature had no such intent—that, 
on the contrary, it intended the words to mean 
exactly what Kennecott contends they do mean—is 
evident from an examination of the legislative his-
tory of the provision and the construction given it 
by the Commission itself for many years following 
its enactment. 
For an understanding of the legislative back-
ground of the depletion provision, which was first 
adopted by the Utah Legislature in 1931, a brief 
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Trana. 
review of the treatment accorded depletion for 
mines under the Federal income tax laws is apposite. 
The purpose of a deduction for depletion in 
computing any tax levied on income is, of course, to 
avoid the taxing as income of that part of the gross 
57 return of a "wasting-assets" enterprise which repre-
et seq. sents the exhaustion of capital. 
The income tax laws of the Federal Govern-
472 ment have for many years included provisions for 
et seq. an allowance for depletion to taxpayers engaged in 
a wasting-assets business. In the earlier years of 
the Federal income tax, the basis of the depletion 
allowance for mines was the cost of the property or 
its fair market value as of March 1, 1913 or its dis-
covery date. The determination of such fair market 
value generally necessitated estimating the future 
60 output of the mine, the period of production, the 
et seq., prices for the product which could be obtained over 
66 such future period, the cost of production, the plant 
et seq. and equipment required, and other factors requiring 
an estimate for the future. When the results had 
been so estimated, it was necessary to discount them 
back to obtain a present value. That value was then 
divided by the estimated mineral units to be pro-
duced in order to determine the depletion per unit 
allowable as a tax deduction. 
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Trans. 
There was much complaint as to these difficul-
62, 65 ties, of the uncertainty inherent in their application, 
and of the fact that they seemed to work unfair dis-
crimination between various taxpayers. Provision 
had been made in the Federal statute for "percen-
tage depletion" for oil and gas in 1926. The ques-
tion then arose of providing for percentage deple-
tion for mines. This matter was given extended 
study by the Joint Committee of Internal Revenue 
of the United States Congress, which requested the 
preparation of a report with respect thereto by its 
staff. As a result, the so-called Parker Report, 
which included the Shepherd Report as an appendix, 
68, 73 was submitted to the Joint Committee in 1929. These 
reports recommended the adoption of percentage 
depletion for metal mines, the Parker report recom-
mending that it be based upon net income (one alter-
native suggested being 33%% of net income) and 
70, 84-6, the Shepherd Report that it be 15% of gross income 
299 with a limitation of 50% of net income. 
Percentage depletion represents an effort to get 
68 away from the difficulties of estimating future 
receipts and costs, inherent in the former "analytic 
appraisal method," by utilizing actual receipts and 
costs each year instead of such future estimates. It 
was recognized that over a period of time a percent-
age of current net income (gross receipts, less costs) 
would be substantially equivalent to the deduction 
computed in the former manner if the future esti-
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Trans. 
• mates there made had been correct. This purpose 
is recognized in the Parker Report. As appears 
therefrom, percentage depletion was not intended 
generally to arrive at a substantially different allow-
ance from that sought under the former method, but 
rather to simplify the procedure by which the allow-
ance was to be determined. Thus, the Parker Report 
68 states: 
"The methods of percentage depletion pro-
posed for consideration are not such a departure 
from the present system as would appear from a 
preliminary inspection. The analytic method of 
valuation now used in most important cases ar-
rives at a value through the estimation of future 
expected profits. Depletion based on a percentage 
of the net income from the property merely uses 
actual figures instead of estimated figures." 
# # # # # 
"It has already been pointed out that the most 
important valuations for depletion purposes are 
computed by the analytic appraisal method. This 
method requires an estimate to be made of the 
future profits of the mine. If it were possible to 
determine these future profits correctly, they 
would equal the net income from the property. 
The question at once arises: What is the use of 
estimating such profits if the actual profits can be 
. : used? In fact, it can be proven mathematically 
that depletion by a percentage of net income and 
. . depletion by the analytic appraisal method will 
be the same if the expected profit is correctly 
estimated in using the latter method." • 
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As above indicated, when the Utah franchise 
tax was passed in 1931 (Laws of 1931, Chapter 39), 
the Federal income tax law had not yet provided for 
percentage depletion for mines. It did, however, use 
a percentage of-"net income . . . from the propert)^' 
as a limitation on the discovery depletion of mines 
otherwise allowable. 
Under the practice of the Treasury in applying 
this limitation, net income represented the actual 
selling price of the products less all the costs of 
production. The only exception to this practice was 
one, not applicable to Kennecott's case, where a rep-
resentative market or field price existed for the 
product at a stage in its processing prior to that in 
487 which it was actually sold. 
At the time the Utah franchise tax statute was 
under consideration, the Parker Report, and related 
5, 81-2 Shepherd Report, were considered by the Utah Tax 
Revision Commission. Both of these reports, in 
recommending the adoption by Congress of percent-
age depletion for mines, assumed a determination of 
78 gross income and net income, based on actual re-
ceipts less expenses, which was in accordance with 
the construction given the then existing statute and 
regulations by the Treasury, as outlined above. 
Thus, the Parker Report points out, in the quota-
tions given above, that the purpose of adopting per-
centage depletion is to avoid the necessity of making 
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the estimates and assumptions necessary under the 
formei- practice of determining the fair market value 
of the property. The purpose was to simplify, and 
not to complicate, the procedure. Nowhere in the 
Parker Report is the suggestion made that the per-
centage depletion there recommended should be 
based upon a determination of net income which 
would differ from that then being followed by the 
Treasury with respect to the limitation of the allow-
ance for discovery depletion. 
On this point the Shepherd Report expressly 
stated: 
"For the purpose of this subdivision 'the 
gross income from the property' shall be the com-
petitive market receipts, or its equivalent, re-
ceived from the sale of the crude, partially bene-
ficiated or refined gold, silver, or copper, the 
product actually disposed of by the taxpayers to 
govern the method of computation of receipts in 
all cases, and in the case of all other metals, coal 
and oil and gas, the competitive market receipts, 
or its equivalent, received from the sale of the 
crude products, or concentrates on an f. o. b. mine, 
mill, or well basis." 
"The 'net income of the taxpayer (computed 
without allowance for depletion) from the prop-
erty' shall be determined by deducting allowable 
expenses except depletion from 'the gross income 
from the property' as defined above." 
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T r a n s . .-•••' 
65, 81-2 The Parker Report, and accompanying Shep-
herd Report, were carefully considered by the Tax 
Revision Commission in its consideration of the 
proposed Utah franchise tax legislation enacted in 
1931. Mr. G. C. Earl* testified as to the hearings 
with respect to such legislation. Mr. Earl testified 
82 as follows: 
"I attended as a representative of the Copper 
Company most of the hearings which were held 
at the time this law was being considered, and in 
addition some conferences which were held on the 
side. The two important men who took part in 
those conferences were Dr. Lutz, who had been 
brought here by the Tax Commission, and Mr. 
Graton. There were others, Mr. Brownrigg, who 
had been employed under Mr. Vandegriff, who 
had been employed by the producers. And there 
were a great number of conferences held, discus-
sions took place, as to the method of arriving at 
depletion. That was the primary discussion that 
took place at most of these conferences. 
"The quotations were read from the Parker 
Report and there was considerable discussion 
among the representatives of various units as to 
whether they should use 15 per cent of the gross 
* Mr. Earl has been employed as a mining engineer 
by Kennecott or its predecessor since 1909. Since 
1938 he has been Chief Engineer of the Utah Cop-
per Division. He has had close contact with 
Federal and State tax questions and participated 
actively in conferences and hearings relating to 
J-43,82 the 1931 Utah franchise tax legislation. 
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Tran«. 
or 33^3 per cent of the net. I t finally came out, of 
course, when the law was passed with 33% per 
cent of the net. Both of these plans had been 
included and had been discussed in the Parker 
Report." 
In his testimony Mr. Earl read from a report 
of the Tax Revision Commission which specifically 
stated that net income should be determined under 
the Utah law substantially as it was determined 
under the Federal law, since that arrangement 
would have the great advantage of being familiar 
to all of the larger business concerns and would per-
mit the taxpayer to comply with the provisions of 
the state law by using the data on the basis of which 
100,104 the Federal return was prepared. Mr. Earl testified: 
" . . . as there was no difference between the 
Federal and State statutes as to apparently what 
constitutes gross income from the property, we 
made a particular study as to what would be the 
amount allowable under the 'net income from the 
property' phrase. 
"At that time the hearings had all been held, 
the law had been passed, but the Federal percent-
age depletion basis had not been adopted (by 
Congress). It was not adopted (by the Federal 
Government) until 1932. It was understood by 
everyone which we came in contact with that the 
net income from the property was to be inter-
preted exactly as it had been interpreted in arriv-
ing at the income on the analytic or cost basis, 
and this had all been reported in the Parker 
Report . ' ;. 
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Trans. 
"This matter was discussed with the repre-
sentatives of the Tax Commission, and in the 
first return which was filed for the Utah Copper 
Company, there was no determination of deple-
tion because there was no net income, and the 
amount of the tax assessable was determined on 
the basis of the values of the property. 
"When the time came to take a deduction for. 
depletion, the Federal law had been passed, and 
it confirmed the understandings which had re-
sulted from the studies which the Federal Bureau 
had undertaken. It was exactly on that premise 
that the Utah Copper Company then elected to 
calculate the depletion allowance under the State 
franchise tax act on the percentage basis." 
It is clear from the foregoing that, in enacting 
the franchise tax in 1931 providing for percentage 
depletion, the Utah Legislature intended that the 
then Federal practice should apply in a case such 
as Kennecott's — namely, where there is no repre-
sentative market or field price for the mineral prod-
ucts in a stage prior to that in which they are sold, 
the net income from the property is the gross re-
ceipts from the actual sale of the products less all 
production expenses. 
In 1932 the Federal statute was amended to 
104, 300, provide for percentage depletion for metal mines 
478,480 at 15% of the gross income from the property but 
not in excess of 50% of the net income from the 
property. The Federal regulations were then rewrit-
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ten and amplified. They applied the prior practice 
of determining net income in specifically prescrib-
ing that the gross income from the property was 
represented by the receipts from the sale of the 
mineral products less the costs of any processes or 
transportation (other than those considered part 
of ore extraction and concentration), except only in 
the case where there was a representative market or 
field price for the mineral products in a stage prior 
to that in which they were actually sold. Thus, Eeg. 
77, Art, 221 (g), after providing the conditions under 
which a representative market or field price was to 
be applied, continued: 
"Where there is no such representative mar-
ket or field price (as of the date of sale), then 
there shall be used in lieu thereof the representa-
tive market or field price of the first marketable 
product resulting from any process or processes 
minus the cost (including transportation costs) 
of the processes not listed below [costs of ore 
extraction and concentration not deducted]." 
(Material in brackets added.) 
Mr. Fernald, who, as chairman of the Tax Com-
mittee of the American Mining Congress, attended 
a number of meetings with the Treasury Depart-
ment officials in connection with the formulation of 
these new regulations with respect to percentage 
depletion, testified as follows: 
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Trans, 
" . . . In the discussion . . . the question had 
been raised as to whether, if the mining company 
itself conducted the further processes, such as 
smelting, transportation, etc., the deduction should 
% be made for the actual cost to it for conducting 
such processes or transportation, or whether there 
should be addition of an amount for the profit of 
conducting such an operation so as to bring the 
deduction to be made up to the amount which 
would have been charged if it had been conducted 
by an independent concern. Secretary Douglas 
stated that this would be a refinement which he 
did not believe was intended and that the deduc-
tion should be only for actual cost. This would 
avoid getting into a speculative field which he did 
not believe was intended and he did not believe 
was worth while. The regulations were written 
accordingly." • 
The regulation quoted above was in effect at the 
time the Utah statute was re-enacted in the Utah 
Code of 1933. 
Ex. Since Kennecott's products had no representa^ 
15(2), tive market or field price prior to the stage in which 
Tr. 452, they were actually sold, the application of the 
481 amended Federal regulations would result in the 
same determination as that prescribed by the Utah 
statute and then applied by the Commission — 
namely, deduction of all costs and expenses, except 
depletion, from gross receipts to arrive at the net 
income from the property. 
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Trans. 
None of the foregoing Treasury regulations on 
depletion for mines provided that profits should be 
attributed to any processes or to transportation. 
It was not until the 1940 amendment to the 
Federal regulations respecting percentage deple-
tion was adopted that mention was made in the 
regulations of any deduction of profits attributable 
to processes beyond the mining stage. Such amended 
regulations provided as follows (Reg. 77, Art. 221 
(g), as amended in 1940): 
"If there is no such representative market or 
field price (as of the date of sale) then there shall 
be used in lieu thereof, the representative market 
or field price of the first marketable product 
resulting from any process or processes (or, if 
the product in its crude state is merely trans-
ported, the price for which sold) minus the costs 
and proportionate profits attributable to the 
transportation and the processes not listed below." 
However Mr. Fernald's uncontradicted testi-
483-4 mony makes it clear that even these 1940 Treasury 
regulations, providing for attribution of profits, 
related only to cases where the further processes or 
transportation were performed by the taxpayer 
itself: 
uThe regulations continued in this form [that 
* of 1932] until 1940, when the Bureau felt that the 
regulations should be so changed as to require 
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deduction not merely for the cost of the processes 
or the transportation, but also for any profit 
attributable to the conduct of such operations. The 
Treasury Regulations were then amended to this 
effect. The amended provisions were clear that 
as to transportation it was only 'if transported 
by the taxpayer' that 'the proportionate profits 
attributable to transportation' should be sub-
tracted from the sale price of the product to deter-
mine 'gross income from the property'. Similar 
specification was not written into the regulations 
with respect to any profits attributable to further 
processes but this has always been understood, 
and the regulations have always been so applied. 
"In discussions of this question by repre-
sentatives of the mining industry with the Bureau 
and Treasury officials, it was definitely stated 
that the requirement for deducting 'the costs and 
proportionate profits attributable to the trans-
portation and the processes not listed below' 
meant and could only mean the 'proportionate 
profits, if any, attributable'. It was definitely 
stated by the Treasury officials that if the trans-
portation and the further processes were con-
ducted by independent concerns whose charges 
included any profits attributable to the conduct 
of such operations, there tvould be no occasion for 
increasing any such charge of an independent by 
any profits of the taxpayer's attributable thereto, 
and that this was clearly the meaning and intent 
of the wording used in the regulation. This has 
been the consistent interpretation and procedure 
followed by the Bureau." (Italics supplied.) 
Thus, the 1940 change in the Federal regulations 
(even if it constituted a proper basis for a change in 
the application of the Utah statute enacted nine 
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Trans. 
years earlier, which we deny) resulted in no change 
in the computation of gross income from the prop-
erty of the Utah Copper Division, since the smelting 
and refining processes and transportation following 
the mining operations were not performed by Ken-
necott but were performed by independent contrac-
Ex. tors at charges to Kennecott which took fully into 
3(2), account any income or profits applicable to the con-
Tr. 89, duct of and investment in such further operations. 
236, 304, It should be noted that the Federal law and regula-
309,460, tions have never required attribution of profit to 
483-4, sales activities conducted by a taxpayer; such at-
489 tribution relates only to production processes and 
transportation necessary to put the mineral product 
into a marketable form. 
Finally, the Federal rule as previously in effect 
or as subsequently amended, does not constitute a 
basis or precedent for use by the Commission of its 
algebraic formula in computing percentage deple-
tion. No such formula or procedure is in any way 
authorized or applied under Federal regulations or 
law. 
The unfairness of the Commission's construc-
tion of the depletion provision, as applied to Kenne-
cott, is clearly evidenced by a comparison of its 
decision in this case with the rule applied by it in 
the case of other mining companies. 
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75 In the case of a majority of the metal mines, 
et seq., the mining company sells its concentrates to an 
487 independent smelter and receives therefor what is 
et seq. termed the "net smelter return". Such net smelter 
return represents the market value of the estimated 
recoverable saleable metal products at the appro-
priate price quotations, less deduction for the 
amount to be paid by the purchasing smelter to 
others for the transportation, refining and other 
services to be performed by others and for the 
agreed amounts for the services of the smelter for 
its own smelting of the products or for any other 
services performed by the smelting corporation 
itself. 
Thus, for example, if only the smelting is per-
formed by the smelting corporation which purchases 
the concentrates, and all other services for trans-
portation, refining and selling are performed by 
others, the smelting corporation will deduct a fair 
charge for its smelting (which will include allow-
ance for its expected profit for performing the 
smelting) and will deduct the amounts it will pay or 
will expect to pay to others for their transportation, 
refining or other services. If, however, the smelting 
corporation will itself perform both the smelting 
and the refining, but transportation or other serv-
ices will be performed by independent concerns, 
the smelting corporation will deduct a fair charge 
for its smelting and its refining (which will include 
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allowance for expected profit for performing such 
services) and will deduct the amounts it will pay to 
others for the services rendered by them. 
Under the Utah statute, as consistently applied 
by the Commission, in the case of a company so sell-
ing its concentrates to an independent smelter, the 
"net income from the property" to which the per-
centage depletion factor is to be applied is deter-
mined by treating the net smelter return as the gross 
income from the property and deducting therefrom, 
to arrive at net income, the mining company's own 
costs of mining, concentrating, overhead, etc. In 
its Findings in this case, the Commission states: 
"If Kennecott's operations were limited to 
mining (including milling of the ores) and it sold 
all of its concentrates to A. S. & R., for example, 
our problem would be a relatively simple one. The 
cash receipts derived from the sale of concen-
trates would constitute the gross income from the 
property from which we could subtract the costs 
and expenses of mining and milling, together with 
federal income and excess profits taxes attribut-
able to the operation (see New Park Mining Co. 
et al v. State Tax Commission, 113 Utah 410, 196 
P. 2d 485), and the resulting figure would be the 
net income from the property. Thirty-three and 
one-third per cent of such net income would be 
the proper amount of the deduction allowed by the 
F. 70 statute for depletion of the mining property." 
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So far as the allowance for depletion is con-
cerned, there is no substantive difference between 
Kennecott's operations and those of a mining com-
pany which sells its product to an independent smel-
ter for a net smelter return, or from the case 
assumed by the Commission in the above quotation. 
Kennecott, while not selling its product to an inde-
pendent smelter, did not itself own or operate the 
smelters or refineries, or the transportation facili-
ties, utilized to obtain the marketable products which 
it sold. For these further processes and transporta-
tion Kennecott paid a charge which embodied all of 
the costs of the services so rendered and all profits 
to be attributed to the rendition of those services, 
just as the mining company selling its product to 
the independent smelter paid for such costs and 
profits through their deduction in computing the 
net smelter return. Since Kennecott did not itself 
conduct the activities of smelting and refining, and 
related transportation, it did not have any profits 
attributable thereto for the purpose of computing 
percentage depletion. 
There is no logical or economic justification for 
treating the two situations in a different manner as 
respects the application of the percentage depletion 
provision. 
C. The long administrative construction accorded the 
percentage depletion provision and other statutory 
provisions by the Commission is in accord with 
that for which Kennecott contends and should be 
followed. 
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As shown above, the Utah Legislature, in adop-
ting the percentage depletion provision in 1931, 
clearly intended that the term "net income from 
the property" meant (in line with the then Federal 
law and regulations) total gross receipts less costs 
and expenses incurred in producing a marketable 
product. 
For over fourteen years, after the enactment 
of the statute, namely, until 1945, the Commission 
itself consistently so construed the statute and dur-
ing that period accepted and approved tax returns 
filed by Kennecott and other taxpayers based on 
the method of computing percentage depletion here 
contended for by Kennecott. Neither at the time 
that the franchise Tax statute was enacted in 1931 
nor subsequent thereto, until the present contro-
versy began in 1945, did anyone, so far as known 
to Kennecott, least of all the Commission, contend 
that under that statutory provision income should 
be separately allocated to the several parts of a uni-
fied operation all of which were necessary to pro-
duce the marketable product, or that an algebraic 
formula was necessary in order to arrive at the 
proper allowance for depletion under the statute. 
During this period the franchise tax was reenacted 
without change by the Legislature in the Eevised 
Statutes of Utah, 1933, c. 13, Title 80, and it was 
thereafter amended in several respects, but without 
changing the particular provisions with which we 
are here concerned, first, by the Laws of Utah 1935, 
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c. 89, and, secondly, by the Laws of Utah 1937, e. 
109, the latter to define gross income. By neither 
amendment was Section 80-13-21, (Sec. 59-13-20, 
Utah Code 1953) with which we are here concerned, 
as theretofore consistently construed and applied 
by the public body charged with its administration, 
changed in any respect. The State Franchise Tax 
Act, without further change, was embodied in the 
compilations of the Utah Code of 1943 and 1953. 
This long period of administrative interpre-
tation not only evidences a clear understanding on 
the part of everyone (Legislature, Commission and 
taxpayers) as to what the statute meant when it 
was enacted, but, also, the acceptance by the Legis-
lature of that application by the Commission. There 
can be no basis now for departing from what was 
clearly not only original legislative intent, but, also, 
the practical application so given the statute by the 
Commission. 
Furthermore, the present decision of the Com-
mission on this point cannot be reconciled with its 
construction of the analogous language of the Utah 
ad valorem tax called the "Net Proceeds Tax", Sec. 
80-5-56, (Sec. 59-5-57, Utah Code 1953) which pro-
vides : 
"All metalliferous mines and mining claims, 
both placer and rock in place, shall be assessed at 
$5.00 per acre, and in addition thereto, at a value 
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equal to two times the net annual proceeds thereof 
(italics supplied) for the calendar year next pre-
preceding." 
The Commission has consistently taken, and 
still takes, the position that the language means the 
entire proceeds from the ultimate sales less related 
costs and expenses, and not something less than 
that figure. 
The Mining Occupation tax (§ 59-5-67, Utah Code 
1953) was first enacted in 1937 and was a substitute 
for a part of the Net Proceeds Tax. The Net Pro-
ceeds Tax had been upon the value of the mine calcu-
lated by statute at three times the annual net pro-
ceeds; the multiple was reduced to two and the 
occupation tax of " 1 % of gross amount received for 
or the gross value of metalliferous ore sold" was 
imposed to replace the lost value resulting from the 
change in the net proceeds. Again no deduction is 
allowed as for profit or income attributable to any 
process, no receipts, income or profit is attributed 
to any process. 
«#*# ^Q Utah law for computing net proceeds of 
a mine and the mine occupation tax law do not 
allow any more than the cost of transportation 
and smelting and refining to be deducted. It does 
not seem fair or reasonable for the state to take 
one position or the other according to which makes 
the larger tax, and that is what it would be doing 
by applying this formula." Testimony of Sey-
mour Wells--T-r. 236*237). 
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' Speaking of the net proceeds tax, the Commis-
sion itself has said in its Third Biennial Report for 
the years 1935-36:
 ;. - . 
"The Tax Commission insisted that it was 
concerned only with the gross, proceeds realized 
from an actual sale of the ore, or at least the 
value of the metals extracted from: the ores after 
they had passed through the smelting process. 
*** The company keeps separate records for each 
of the different divisions of its operation, and the 
profits which are made by the milling and smelt-
ing divisions are not allocated back as a profit 
from the mining operation. The result is that the 
milling and smelting profits are not considered 
by the company to be any part of tide gross pro-
ceeds of the mine. Accordingly a lesse'r tax upon 
the mine results. 
"The Commission was of the opinion that the 
sum realized from an actual sale should be con-
sidered as gross proceeds and also directed that 
the company was entitled ta deductions for only 
its 'actual costs of milling and smelting.' #*# 
"We do not recommend any legislation that 
would seek to prohibit or limit the right of these 
companies to pursue this method of operation. 
**•* If one mining operator has developed a more 
economical operation than another operator and 
receives greater-net proceeds^we believe that the 
ultimate consideration is the'ambunt of the net 
proceed -by whatsoever method of operation 
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Traits. 
derived. One business man way have a more eco-
nomical method of operation and may have made 
a greater net profit for income tax purposes; his 
tax is then based on that greater net profit. No 
deduction is allowed to him because he has a more 
economical method of conducting his business." 
That is exactly the way, up until March 10,1945 
for the year 1942, that Kennecott's franchise tax 
liability for its Utah Copper Division has been 
118 determined by the defendant. 
Similar statutes should be similarly construed. 
In United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard S. S. Co., 
284 U. S. 474, 52 S. Ct. 247, 76 L. ed. 408, interpre-
tation of the Shipping Act was involved, and the 
similarity in the applications there and here will be 
apparent from the following quotation from the 
opinion: 
"*** When the Shipping Act was passed, the 
Interstate Commerce Act had been in force in its 
original form or in amended forms for more than 
a generation. Its provisions had been applied to 
a great variety of situations, and had been judi-
cially construed in a large number and variety of 
cases. *** In this situation the Shipping Act was 
passed. In its general scope and purpose, as well 
. as in its terms, that act closely parallels the Inter-
state Commerce Act; and we cannot escape the 
conclusion that Congress intended that the two 
acts, each in its own field, should have like inter-
pretation, application and effect. It follows that 
the settled construction in respect of the earlier 
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act must be applied to the later one, unless, in 
particular instances, there be something peculiar 
in the question under consideration, or dissimi-
larity in the terms of the act relating thereto, 
requiring a different conclusion." 
D. The method of computing percentage depletion 
contended for by Kennecott is in accord with the 
objective of this Court in Kennecott Copper Corpo-
ration v. State Tax Commission, 221 P. 2d 857. 
In its opinion the Commission states that "with 
respect to the issue of depletion, wTe are bound by 
the ruling of the Supreme Court" in the case of 
Kennecott Copper Corporation v. State Tax Com-
mission cited supra. 
However, as will be shown that decision does 
not support the computation of percentage deple-
tion here contended for by the Commission. Kenne-
cott also submits that whatever be its interpreta-
tion that decision relates to the tax for the year 
1942 solely and for subsequent taxable years the pre-
centage depletion deduction prescribed by the 
statute is to be computed as Kennecott asserts, that 
is 3 3 % % of the net income from the property shall 
be determined by deducting only costs and expenses 
from the gross receipts from sales of the mineral 
products. 
The previous discussion under this Point I I 
has demonstrated, we believe, that the position taken 
by Kennecott is the proper interpretation of the 
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statutory provision. Kennecott's construction repre-
sents a normal and logical interpretation of the 
words "net income from the property" and one con-
sistent with other uses of the term "net income 
in the statute and other analogous statutes whereas 
the Commission's use of an algebraic formula in-
volving quadratics is not a computation reasonably 
to be deemed to have been intended by the Legis-
lature. Moreover, the theory of the Commission 
that allocation of profits among various production 
processes can properly be made in proportion to 
their costs is insupportable. 
Kennecott has also clearly demonstrated from 
the legislative history that the Utah Legislature, 
when it enacted the franchise tax in 1931 intended 
the term "net income from the property" as re-
spects depletion to have the meaning given under 
the then Federal Treasury practice and in the 
Parker and Shepherd Reports. As stated by Mr. 
Ear l who took part in the conferences, it was this 
Treasury practice and these reports that the Utah* 
Tax Revision Commission and Legislature con-
sidered when they decided upon the percentage 
depletion provision to be incorporated in the Utah 
statute. 
I t has been shown that, even if the 1940 amend-
ments to the Treasury regulations respecting per-
centage depletion for mines were relevant in the 
construction of the Utah statute (which Eennecott 
104 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
denies), nevertheless even under these 1940 amend-
ments and Treasury practice up to this very date, 
the computation of depletion would be made in this 
case as Kennecott contends. It has also been shown 
that where, as here, smelting, refining and trans-
portation are conducted by persons independent of 
the taxpayer, the deduction of the cost thereof to 
the taxpayer already includes the profit reasonably 
attributable to such operations, since the charge 
made by the processor or carrier includes both his 
costs and profit. 
Finally, Kennecott has shown that the Commis-
sion in applying the statute followed the interpre-
tation of the percentage depletion provision for 
whicli Kennecott here contends, from the date of 
enactment of the statute in 1931 until 1945, when 
the Commission in this case and for the first time 
introduced its algebraic computation. Such long 
continued administrative interpretation clearly evi-
dences the Commission's understanding that the 
statute was intended by the Legislature to be so 
applied, and that interpretation must be deemed to 
have been accepted by the Legislature when it re-
enacted the legislation in 1933 and thereafter 
changed the franchise tax law in several respects 
without changing the percentage depletion provi-
sion. 
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We believe that the evidence hereinbefore sum-
marized definitely establishes the proper construc-
tion of the percentage depletion provision in the Utah 
franchise tax statute. The question at issue not 
only can, but should be, now considered by the Court 
on its merits. This Court remanded the case for 
that purpose. 
In the 1942 case a number of issues were 
brought before this Court, some of which were 
decided by the Court and one of which was referred 
back to the Commission. 
The Court there decided two points not directly 
involving depletion. It held that Federal subsidies 
(premiums or bonus payments for emergency mineral 
production) were includable in income for franchise 
tax purposes. It also held that the Utah franchise 
tax was properly computed upon the net income 
of the Utah Copper Division alone, instead of on the 
entire net income of Kennecott from all of its divi-
sions. There is no dispute in the present case as to 
either of these points. 
As to depletion for the year 1942, the Court 
decided two additional points. One was that Kenne-
cott should compute depletion under the statutory 
provision of 33%% of net income, and not on some 
different basis, since in filing its tax returns Ken-
necott had elected to follow percentage depletion 
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and had not made a timely request or shown a sub-
stantial reason for a change in method. This point 
is not involved in the present case. 
The other point relative to depletion decided 
by the Court was the question as to whether net 
income subject to depletion should be computed 
before deducting Federal taxes, as had been the 
accepted procedure in earlier years, or after deduc-
ting such Federal taxes. The Court sustained the 
latter position. This point is no longer in dispute, 
and Kennecott's present contentions give full effect 
in the computation of the depletion allowance, to the 
deduction of Federal taxes. 
The major part of the Court's opinion was de-
voted to the foregoing questions. The Court then 
proceeded to consider the calculation of the 33%% 
depletion allowance. The opinion of the Court on 
this point concludes as follows: 
"We need not place our approval on the 
formula used by the Commission or arbitrarily 
determine the break-through point between min-
ing operations and post-mining activities. All we 
need do in this case is to point out that there are 
two possible paths for the taxpayer to take. The 
Commission might agree that it take either but 
it cannot traverse both. Either the net income 
is from the property and should be allocated to 
this state, or the net income is from both the 
property and the post-mining activities and they 
are not so related that the net income cannot be 
roughly allocated to both sources. The lengths to 
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which the taxpayer might go under its theory is 
aptly illustrated by the figures used in its first 
return." Frorri an appproximate net income, before 
depletion, in this stette of $18,000,000, Kennecott 
seeks to establish a depletion allowance of $13,-
,: 000,000, This is far in excess of the 3 3 % % pro-
vided for by statute. 
•'"In disposing of this last contention, we hold 
that if Kennecott files its return on an allotted 
basis that it must allocate some of its net income 
to post-mining operations before computing deple-
tion. 
"The case is remanded with instructions to 
determine and enter a deficiency judgment in 
accordance with the views herein expressed." 
As will be noted, while the case was remanded 
with instructions to enter a deficiency judgment, 
the Court expressly stated that it was not placing 
its approval upon the formula employed by the 
Commission. Accordingly, the computation of the 
depletion provision for 1942 remained to be made 
by the Commission, and the formula and its appli-
cation Continued subject to judicial review. 
Mo a full reading of the opinion of 
the Court it would seem that in stating "if Kenne-
cott files its return on an alloted basis . . . it must 
allocate!'some of its net income to post-mining opera-
tions before computing depletion", the Court acted 
under the belief that Kennecott was taking an in-
consistent position and that (even after allowance 
for Federal taxes) if its contention were sustained, 
108 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Kennecott would receive in the calculation of the 
Utah tax the benefit of a depletion allowance very 
substantially in excess of 33%% of its net income, 
before depletion, allocated to Utah. 
Nowhere in its opinion does the Court mention 
the evidence and arguments outlined above bearing 
on the interpretation of the depletion provision. 
Rather, it apparently assumed that, in computing 
depletion, some attribution of profits to post-mining 
activities was essential to prevent Kennecott from 
"eating its cake and having it too" through allo-
cating to Utah only a portion of its net income aris-
ing out of the sale of its mineral products, while at 
the same time claiming as a deduction from such 
portion of net income a depletion allowance equal 
to 33%% of its entire net income allocable both 
within and without the State of Utah. 
Thus, the Court stated in the above portion of 
its opinion: "from an approximate net income, 
before depletion, in this State of $18,000^000, Ken-
necott seeks to establish a depletion allowance of 
$13,000,000. This is far in excess of the 33y3% pro-
vided for by the statute." Again, on page 865, the 
Court states: 
"If the total net income were allocated to this 
state then we might be faced with the difficult 
question as to whether we were not on the one 
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hand permitting the post-mining operations to 
increase the franchise tax due the state and on 
the other hand denying the taxpayer the right to 
the increased income for depletion calculations. 
However, when the taxpayer allocates the net 
income received from the appreciation to out of 
state net income, another question presents itself." 
The Court thus recognized that if the income 
from post-mining (as well as mining) operations 
were allocated to Utah and thus served to increase 
the net income before depletion used in computing 
the Utah tax, it would be unfair to deny to the tax-
payer a deduction of 33%% of all such income 
assigned to Utah. The Court felt it unnecessary 
finally to decide this question. It evidently regarded 
the case before it as one where, unless corrected 
in the depletion allowance itself, any income from 
out-of-state post-mining operations would serve to 
increase the depletion deductible against Utah net 
income, while at the same time such post-mining 
income would remain free of the Utah tax because 
allocated outside of the State. 
This view of the Court is also evidenced by the 
other statement from the Court's opinion quoted 
above and by computations made by it earlier in its 
opinion. In that quotation the Court assumes that 
against an approximate net income before depletion, 
allocated to Utah, of $18,000,000, Kennecott sought 
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to establish a depletion allowance of $13,000,000.# 
This the Court pointed out was far in excess of 
331/3% of the former figure. The sum of $18,000,-
000, given by the Court as Utah net income before 
depletion, is evidently the Court's approximation 
of the sum of $5,803,351 appearing earlier in the 
opinion (which it deemed to represent net income 
after depletion allocated by Kennecott to Utah) and 
* It should also be recognized that this $13,000,000 
figure for depletion, claimed on the original tax 
return and used by the Court, did not give effect 
to the deduction of Federal taxes required by the 
Court's decision or certain other necessary adjust-
ments, all of which are corrected in the computa-
tion of depletion now claimed by Kennecott. Ken-
necott now claims depletion in the amount of 
$7,938,367 upon $23,815,102, which latter amount 
both the Commission and Kennecott agree is the 
correct total net income from mineral products 
before depletion. This results in $15,876,735 total 
net income from mineral products after depletion. 
Adding to this amount the small amount of income 
from sources other than mineral production, 
makes $16,061,627 net income after depletion 
which is subject to allocation to Utah according 
to the three-factor formula. Applying the allo-
cation factor of 66.926% used in the 1942 case, the 
net income from mineral products after deple-
tion allocated to Utah would be $10,625,664. (This 
is before taking into account any sundry income.) 
The foregoing should be taken into account in 
any consideration of the figures given in the 
Court's decision. 
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$13,568,213 (representing the total amount claimed 
by Kennecott as depletion). Evidently the Court 
regarded Kennecott as contending that the entire 
amount of depletion was deductible against the por-
tion of net income before depletion allocable to Utah, 
otherwise there could be no occasion for adding the 
two figures. This is not and never was Kennecott's 
contention. 
On the contrary, Kennecott's contention on this 
point conforms with what we regard as the view of 
this Court, when it is recognized that, under the 
statutory method for calculating the tax, the deple-
tion allowance itself is subject to the same allocation 
under the three-factor formula as is the net income 
before depletion. The statute provides for the deter-
mination of total income before depletion and then 
for the deduction therefrom of 33%% of this amount 
(as Kennecott contends), thus arriving at total net 
income after depletion. This amount is then allo-
cated within and without the State of Utah in 
accordance with the prescribed three-factor formula. 
Mathematically, the resulting net income, taxed in 
Utah, is the same as if the allocation had been made 
by applying the three-factor formula separately to 
total net income before depletion and to the deple-
tion allowance itself, and then deducting the deple-
tion so allocated to Utah from the net income before 
depletion so allocated to this State.* Accordingly, 
* This is readily demonstrated by the use of 
rounded-out figures approximating those claimed 
by Kennecott for the year 1942 — namely total 
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Kenneeott's method of determining depletion, when 
combined with the allocation prescribed by the three-
factor formula, results in charging for depletion 
against Utah income, in determining the Utah tax, 
only 33%% of the net income before depletion which 
is allocated to Utah. This we believe is in accord 
with the rationale of the Court's decision. 
net income (before depletion) from mineral pro-
duction of $24,000,000, (in lieu of $23,815,102) and 
an allocation factor of 67% (in lieu of 66.926%) of 
net income after depletion under the three-factor 
formula. In such case, under Kenneeott's con-
tention, the net income subject to the franchise 
tax in Utah would be computed under the statute 
as follows: 
Table I 
Total net income before depletion $24,000,000 
Depletion allowance (33%% of total 
net income before depletion) 8,000,000 
Total net income after depletion $16,000,000 
Net income after depletion allocated 
to Utah (67% of total net income 
after depletion) $10,720,000 
As will be noted, the net income after depletion 
allocated to Utah in Table I is the same as that 
obtained in Table II by allocating separately net 
income before depletion and the depletion allow-
ance. 
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On the other hand, the method advocated by the 
Commission would result in a depletion deduction 
applicable against Utah income substantially less 
than 33y3% of the net income before depletion allo-
cated to Utah. This is because application of the 
three-factor formula results in allocating to Utah 
only a portion of the Commission's reduced allow-
ance for depletion. The Court seems to have over-
looked the fact that the Commission's method of 
computing depletion results in a double reduction of 
the depletion allowance — first, limitation of the 
Table II 
Total net income before depletion $24,000,000 
Net income before depletion, allo-
cated to Utah (67% of total net 
income before depletion) 16,080,000 
Total depletion allowance (33%% 
of total net income before deple-
tion) $8,000,000 
Depletion allowance allocated to 
Utah (67% of total depletion 
allowance) 5,360,000 
Net income after depletion, allo-
cated to Utah (net income before 
depletion allocated to Utah less 
depletion allowance to Utah) .......... 10,720,000 
As will be noted the depletion allowance allocated 
to Utah is 33%% of net income before depletion 
allocated to Utah. 
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depletion allowance to a percentage of only the net 
income attributable to ore extraction and concen-
tration and second, the allocation outside of Utah of 
a portion of this reduced allowance by the applica-
tion of the three-factor formula. 
The only substantial business done by Kennecott 
itself within Utah was that of ore extraction* ^ and 
concentration. It is the net income fairly attribut-
able to this portion of the business which the 
statutory formula seeks to ascertain as the basis 
for the imposition of the franchise tax, and it wais 
such income fairly attributable to the State at which 
the Court was seeking to arrive. As is evident from 
what has preceded, the method of computing deple-
tion contended for by the Commission, in computing 
the Utah tax, deprives Kennecott of depletion equal 
to 33%% of the net income before depletion from 
its aggregate mining operation and thus deprives 
Kennecott of its property without due process of 
law. It thus pro tanto serves to impose the tax on 
a return of capital rather than upon income. We do 
not regard the decision of the Court in the 1942 case 
as intending, much less requiring, any such result. 
Kennecott accordingly maintains that the deci-
sion in the 1942 case does not sustain the Commis-
sion's decision as to the depletion allowance in this 
case, and that the history of the adoption, interpre-
tation and application of the Utah statute does not 
admit such a decision as would support the allow-
US 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ance now determined by the Commission. On the 
contrary, the depletion claimed by Kennecott is in 
accord with the historical purpose and intent of the 
statute and its application and, we believe, accords 




For the calendar year 1942 the Commission must 
obey the mandate of this Court in Case No. 7298, 
entitled Kennecott Copper Corporation et al, v. State 
Tax Commission, 221 P. 2d 857. The Commission's 
attempt here to change the allocation of Kennecott's 
net income within and without the State of Utah for 
the purpose of the State Franchise Tax for that year, 
and otherwise to exceed, modify and elaborate upon 
that mandate, is beyond it's power. 
This Court's decision in Kennecott Copper 
Corporation et al v. State Tax Commission, supra, 
related to Kennecott's tax for the calendar year 
1942 only, and thereby it was finally adjudicated 
that: 
.. 1. Subsidy payments made by the Federal 
government for Kennecott's over-quota production 
•
7
-..- must.be included in Kennecott's gross income. 
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2. * Federal taxes must be deducted in deter-
mining Kennecott's net income, 33%%: of which, 
under the statute, represents the depletion allow-
ance. • " ,:.:'!••:•• 
3. The Commission had not acted arbitrarily 
or capriciously in denying Kenheeott's request to 
amend its 1942 franchise tax return by changing its 
method of reporting from the Utah Copper Divi-
sional basis to that encompassing the operations of 
Kennecott's several divisions. 
4. The Commission did not act arbitrarily in 
refusing to allow Kennecott to amend its 1942 re-
turn by changing from percentage depletion to a 
cost or other basis. *•• ' 
5» In its. return for the calendar year 1942 
. Kennecott applied and followed the statutory allo-
cation formula, which the Commission had applied 
••;,::•"••" and followed in the settlement of 1942 for the years 
: ;
 1935 to 1941, inclusive^ and to which the Commission 
had adhered ever since the passage of the franchise 
tax statute March 12, 1931, and the Commission 
. represented in this Court in its Case No. 7298 and 
Kennecott there conceded .that if confined to the 
- Utah Copper DivisianaL-basis,: the .allocation so 
. *:. arrived at was correct•.;; and this Court a4^pted the 
A, i .Co^i^issi^nX&di^g'S a&c&l^ngl^. .:•;,.;• :..;;.; 
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6. This Court remanded the 6ase to the Com-
mission only to find depletion and therein "to deter-
mine and render a deficiency judgment in accord-
ance with the "views" expressed by the Court in its 
opinion. Therein the Court refrained from placing 
its approval on the formula used by the Commission 
in its computation of depletion. 
The judgment of this Court in Case No. 7298 
wherein final is res adjudicata for the year 1942, 
and all issues raised herein pertaining to the suc-
ceeding years await disposition as new and separate 
causes, consolidated here only for purpose of hear-
ing and review. 
The factor found by the Commission as well as 
by Kennecott to apply to total net income in order 
to obtain the portion thereof attributable to busi-
ness done in the State of Utah was 66.926 per cent. 
Both parties having agreed upon and used that 
allocation factor for assignment of net income de-
rived from business done in Utah, that factor was 
accepted by this Court and that question was accord-
ingly settled and disposed of by this Court. In that 
allocation factor of 66.926 per cent the full 100 per 
cent of sales was assigned outside Utah, this by 
both Kennecott and the Commission, and that fac-
tor was accordingly accepted by this Court for the 
purpose of its decision. The determination of that 
factor by this Court is binding for the year 1942 
and the Commission's attempt to assign .100 per 
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cent of sales to Utah and thus to increase the alloca-
tion factor to Utah to 97.749 per cent is an endeavor 
to raise again an already determined issue. 
5 C . J . S . : 
§ 1964, pages 1499, 1501: 
"a. In General. 
"The decision of a reviewing court becomes 
the law of the case as to all matters properly 
within the scope thereof and controls in all sub-
sequent trials or proceedings. 
u # #
* The rule is especially applicable where 
the appellate court has remanded the cause with 
specific directions as to the steps to be taken by 
the lower court *#* and such rule holds good re-
gardless of whether the decision of the appellate 
court is right or wrong. *#* 
"*
# #
 matters once determined by the appel-
late court cannot, after remand, be again raised 
and relitigated in the lower court." 
§ 1969, page 1526: 
"After determination on appeal and remand 
to the lower court, a party will not be allowed so 
to plead as to open up matters already adjudi-
cated by the appellate court, nor will he be 
allowed, without showing a sufficient reason 
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therefor, even under statute, to plead matters 
which existed and were known by him at the time 
of the first trial and might then have been pleaded 
by him." 
§ 1971, page 1528: 
"The findings cannot be corrected after re-
mand with directions. 
"Where a cause is remanded with directions, 
the lower court cannot correct alleged errors in 
the findings of fact or amend by making addi-
tional findings." 
§1993, page 1557: 
§1993. Effect. 
"Failure of the trial court to follow the deci-
sion or comply with the mandate of the appellate 
court constitutes reversible error." 
That such is the law of Utah is plainly evident 
from the following decisions of this Court: 
Helper State Bank v. Crus, 95 Utah 320, 81 P. 
2nd 359. 
"It is a well established rule in this jurisdic-
tion, as well as in a majority of other jurisdic-
tions, that where the questions of law and fact are 
the same the decision of the first appeal, whether 
• right or wrong, becomes the law of the case on 
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second appeal and is binding as well on the parties 
to the action, the trial court, and the appellate 
court. To this effect was Venard v. Green, 4 Utah 
456, 11 P. 337; Societe des Mines v. Mackintosh, 
7 Utah 35, 24 P. 669; Krantz v. Eio Grande Ry. 
Co., 13 Utah 1, 43 P. 623, 32 L.R.A. 828; Brim v. 
Jones, 13 Utah 440, 45 P. 46, 352; Silva v. Pickard, 
14 Utah 245, 47 P. 144; People's B. & L. Ass'n v. 
Fowble, 18 Utah 206, 55 P. 57; Potter v. Ajax 
Mining Co., 22 Utah 273, 61 P. 999; Herriman 
Irrigation Co. v. Keel, 25 Utah 96, 69 P. 719; 
State v. Mortensen, 27 Utah 16, 74 P. 120, 350; 
Corporation of Members of L.D.S. v. Watson, 30 
Utah 126, 83 P. 731; Teakle v. San Pedro Rail-
road Co. 36 Utah 29, 102 P. 623, 639; Grand Cen-
tral Mining Co. v. Mammoth M. Co., 36 Utah 364, 
104 P. 573, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 254; Grow v. Oregon 
S.L.Ry.Co., 47 Utah 26, 150 P. 970; Chadwick v. 
Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 56 Utah 480, 191 P. 240; 
Thompson v. Reynolds, 59 Utah 416, 204 P. 516; 
Huntsman v. Huntsman, 61 Utah 376, 213 P. 179; 
Forbes v. Butler, 73 Utah 522, 275 P. 772; Utah 
State Nat. Bank v. Livingston, 74 Utah 456, 280 
P. 327; Sessions v. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 
94 Utah 460, 78 P. 2d 645. 
"*** where an appellate court disposes of the 
entire case by directing just what judgment shall 
be entered, then the case is finally disposed of, 
and no new issues can be raised, and the only 
thing that can be determined on another appeal 
is whether the trial court has followed those direc-
tions. And under those conditions, if any party 
has failed to take an appeal or failed to raise any 
issue which it might have raised, it is too late, 
because the appellate court has finally disposed 
of the case." 
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To the cases there cited may be added the following: 
Bolognese v. Anderson et al, 97 Utah 136, 90 P. 
2d 275: 
uOn the former appeal this court unanimously 
determined the tax deed to be invalid on the rec-
ord before it but reversed the action and granted 
a new trial for other reasons. So far as the tax 
proceedings are concerned we are convinced that 
the facts now disclosed by the record remain 
essentially the same as they appeared when the 
case was here before. Such being the case we are 
precluded from again passing on a question which 
was presented, considered and passed upon before 
by this court, by force of the doctrine of the law 
of the case. 5 C.J.S., Appeal and Error, page 
1499, 1508, § 1964, and cases there cited. See also 
Forbes v. Butler, 73 Utah 522, 275 P. 772; Utah 
State National Bank v. Livingston, 74 Utah 456, 
280 P. 327; Clark v. Los Angeles & S.L.R. Co., 
73 Utah 486, 275 P. 582; Grow v. Oregon Short 
Line R. Co., 47 Utah 26, 150 P. 970." 
Powerine Co. v. Zion's Savings Bank & Trust 
Co. et al, 106 Utah 384,148 P. 2d 807: 
"On retrial the District Court, evidently mis-
applying the decision of this court on the former 
appeal, made new findings of fact and conclusions 
of law on matters settled by the opinion of this 
court. It then made further findings covering the 
question of rentals for which the cause had been 
remanded. Since the findings, conclusions and 
judgment on the retrial, except as to rentals, were 
at variance and contrary to the decision of this 
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court on the former appeal, and against the plain-
tiff who prevailed as to those matters on that 
appeal, it brings this appeal. 
"We shall not review our pronouncements here-
tofore made in this case, nor shall we discuss the 
errors assigned, as they deal with matters dis-
cussed in the previous opinion, and upon which 
no new determination should have been made by 
the trial court, except by way of entering findings 
to conform to the previous opinion. Forbes v. 
Butler, 73 Utah 522, 275 P. 772.*** 
Our pronouncements are the law of the case, 
binding no less upon us than upon the lower 
court." 
Phebus et al v. Dunford, Judge, et al, 198 P. 
2d 973. 
Street et al v. Fourth Judicial District Court, 
Utah County et al, 113 Utah 60,191 P. 2d 153: 
"As a general rule, where a judgment or 
decree is affirmed or reversed and remanded with 
directions to enter a particular judgment, the 
trial court may not permit amended or supple-
mental pleadings to be framed to try rights al-
ready settled. 9 Bancroft, op. cit. Sec. 7430. This 
rule is not only reasonable, but necessary, if liti-
gation is ever to come to an end. After an appel-
late court has once ruled upon issues presented 
to it, such ruling becomes the law of the case, and 
the trial court is bound to follow it, even though 
it considers the ruling erroneous." 
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• T h e matter of assigning 100 per cent of sales 
outside Utah for the calendar year 1942 was settled 
in favor of such assignment by agreement of the 
parties and its adoption accordingly by this Court. 
When the Commission was reinvested with juris-
diction of that cause by the decision and mandate 
of this. Court, a limited power was restored to the 
Commission to find the correct amount of deple-
tion for that year and to do only that. The Commis-
sion certainly was not reinvested with jurisdiction 
to repudiate its agreement upon which the Court 
had settled and disposed of that issue, and in direct 
contradiction of the Commission's position then 
taken and acted upon, to assign to Utah 100 per 
cent of. Kenneeott's sales. For the year 1942 the 
authority of this Commission must be confined to 
the computation of depletion as then directed by 
this Court. 
As to depletion, by its decision and mandate 
this Court reinvested the Commission with power 
and authority to compute depletion under the statu-
tory provisions and to make that computation only. 
This Court withheld its approval of the algebraic 
formula devised by the Commission for that pur-
pose, and said: : 
"If Kennecott files its return on an allotted 
basis:•** it must allocate some of its net income 
to post-mining operations before computing deple-
tion." .:..•••••;...:.. 
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As discussed in Subsection D of Point I I of 
this brief, Kennecott submits that its method of 
computing the depletion deduction is in accordance 
with this Court's objective, and that the Commis-
sion's method is contrary thereto. 
IV. 
Point. 
Under the facts and circumstances here disclosed 
the Commission is not empowered to assess interest 
on deficiencies, if any, adjudged against Kennecott, 
and its attempt to do so here is an abuse of the dis-
cretion vested in it by the statute. 
Over and above the Commission's demand for 
additional payments by way of its claimed tax defi-
ciencies for the years 1942 to 1950 both inclusive, 
the Commission claims interest, which, as of June 
15, 1953 it asserts amounted to the sum of $1,283,-
647.81. 
Kennecott had no word of this approaching 
controversy until March 10, 1945 when the Commis-
sion proposed adjustments for the calendar year 
1942. Kennecott had made its return for each the 
years 1942 to 1944 both inclusive, upon the statutory 
allocation formula and depletion calculation in 
accord with the settlement of May 27, 1942 for the 
years 1935 to 1941 inclusive. The Commission com-
puted this interest on the claimed deficiencies for 
each of the years 1942-1950 both inclusive, from the 
15th day of March of each year. It makes no dif-
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ference to the Commission that the statute, Section 
59-13-25, Utah Code 1953, prescribes quarterly pay-
ments on March 15, June 15, September 15, Decem-
ber 15, and that interest shall be computed upon 
such quarterly amounts from those dates, respec-
tively. Section 59-13-28, Utah Code 1953. It is stated 
by the Commission that the final amount of interest 
to be payable will ultimately depend upon the 
amount of tax finally found to be owing. 
This controversy began March 10,1945, with the 
Commission's proposed adjustments for the calendar 
year 1942. The issue revolved mainly about the 
depletion calculation. On January 22,1948, the Com-
mission rendered its decision for the year 1942, 
again as to the depletion calculation, whereupon 
Kennecott carried the case to this Court for review, 
the controversy still revolving about depletion. This 
is Case No. 7298, already discussed, wherein a deci-
sion was rendered August 24,1950, and the case was 
remanded to the Commission to find depletion and 
render a deficiency judgment in accord with the 
views expressed by this Court, 
From March 10, 1945 to this day, within the 
period allowed by the statute, the Commission has 
proposed adjustments with relation to the depletion 
calculation, by consistent recourse to its algebraic 
formula, and Kennecott has duly filed with the Com-
mission its several petitions for redetermination 
directed to the Commission's proposed deficiencies. 
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Trans. 
On March 10, 1951, applicable to the year 1948 
only, the Commission in its then proposed adjust-
ments for the first time and without explanation 
repudiated the statutory three-factor formula and 
substituted therefor its algebraic formula by which 
to compute the portion of Kennecott's net income 
allocable to Utah by which to measure the Utah 
State franchise tax. 
On June 29, 1951, Commission filed amended 
proposed adjustments for each the years 1942 to 
1950, both inclusive, using for each year, in lieu of 
the three-factor statutory formula, the Commission's 
algebraic formula by which to compute the portion 
of Kennecott's net income allocable to Utah by 
which to measure the franchise tax. The aggregate 
tax deficiency as computed by the Commission was 
then stated by it to amount to the sum of $2,712,-
015.04, upon which it computed interest from August 
1st of the year in which the returns were respec-
tively due to August 1, 1951 in the sum of 
$596,081.10. 
Ex. On December 4, 1951, the opening day of the 
A (2), hearing below, the Commission recomputed interest 
Tr. 4-5 from the due date of the return for each of the years 
1942 to 1950 both inclusive, to December 15, 1951, 
then stating the tax deficiency to be the sum of 
$2,712,915.47, and interest to be the sum of $707r 
481.37, While still using its algebraic formula for 
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the depletion calculation and as well for the allo-
cation to Utah for purpose of the tax, the Commis-
sion reserved "the right to this Commission and to 
the Supreme Court if this case again reaches the 
Supreme Court, to amend the deficiencies by assert-
ing tax based on 100 percent of the Utah Division's 
net income." 
On April 2, 1952, in the middle of the hearing 
below, the Commission concluded that its "primary 
obligation in this case is to follow the Utah statute 
***. We have no reason nor can we fail to follow 
the express and explicit terms of our statute." 
Therefore, the Commission concluded it must aban-
don its algebraic formula for the computation of 
that part of Kennecott's net income allocable to 
Utah by which the Utah tax would be measured, 
although retaining that algebraic formula for the 
depletion calculation. However, in lieu of the alge-
braic formula for allocation of net income to Utah, 
the Commission proceeded to assign to Utah 100 
per cent of Kennecott's sales, every one of which 
had been negotiated, effected and concluded in states 
other than Utah. The tax deficiency was then 
stated by the Commission to be $3,848,439.68, and 
interest computed to December 15, 1951, to be 
$1,033,275.71. 
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The decision of the Commission under date of 
July 23, 1953 assigned all sales to Utah, except only 
those of gold and silver, and stated the tax defi-
ciency to be $3,568,041.92, and interest computed to 
June 15, 1953 to be $1,283,647.81. Sales of gold and 
silver were assigned out of Utah because made by 
Kennecott itself instead of by Kennecott Sales 
Corporation acting on Kennecott's behalf. 
Kennecott duly returned its net income for the 
State franchise tax as calculated under the statu-
tory three-factor formula required both by the 
statute and as the statute had been interpreted by 
the Commission over the years 1935 to 1941 inclu-
sive, and prior thereto from the enactment of the 
statute, March 12, 1931. Kennecott paid the fran-
chise tax for each of the years 1942 to 1950 inclu-
sive, here involved, as so returned, and made those 
several paymefnts at the times required by the 
statute. Kennecott has paid to the State of Utah as 
much of the claimed tax as it could, with due regard 
to the lawfulness of the Commission's demand. 
With this over-all picture, the Commission in-
sists on a judgment against Kennecott for the item 
of interest on whatever deficiency may be ulti-
mately adjudged against Kennecott, should there be 
any, computed from March 15th of the year wherein 
the return was due, quite regardless of its subse-
quent proposed adjustments and the subsequent 
amendments of such proposals. 
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. The Utah statute provides as follows: 
59-13-28. "Deficiency - Interest. — Interest 
upon the amount determined as a deficiency shall 
be assessed at the same time as the deficiency, 
shall be paid upon notice and demand from the tax 
commission, and shall be collected as a part of the 
tax at the rate of six per cent per annum from the 
date prescribed for the payment of the tax to the 
date the deficiency is assessed." 
59-13-57. "Power to waive or reduce penalty 
or interest. Upon making a record of its reasons 
therefor, the tax commission shall have the power, 
in its discretion, to waive or reduce any of the 
penalties or interest provided in this chapter or 
to compromise the same." 
It is stated in 51 American Jurisprudence, page 
849, Section 970; 
"Penalties for nonpayment of taxes often 
take the form of the imposition of interest charges 
on the delinquent amounts unpaid, but neither 
interest nor any other form of pecuniary penalty 
may be exacted for delay in payment of taxes 
unless authority therefor is given by legislative 
enactment." 
page 851, Section 974, as follows: 
"A taxpayer should not be charged with 
penalties or with interest for nonpayment of taxes 
until he has had opportunity to pay them. In case 
of real property, for example, he should not be 
charged with penalties until there has been an 
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identification of the property subject to taxation 
and a determination of the amount of taxes due 
upon it." 
page 853, Section.975, as follows: 
"*** Moreover where there is necessity for 
resort to litigation to determine the validity of the 
tax, and particularly where the taxing authorities 
are the moving parties in the litigation, or agree 
to submit the question to the decision of the court, 
the courts have refused to hold the taxpayer liable 
for penalties and interest upon so much of the tax 
as is finally determined to be valid against him. 
This is upon the theory that payment of taxes to 
which the state may not be rightfully entitled 
should not be coerced under threat of penalty. *** 
"The cases which recognize that a taxpayer 
may escape liability for penalties or interest 
where his failure to pay a tax when due is because 
of his contention in good faith that he is not liable 
for the tax,*** do not require as an element of 
good faith that the taxpayer be upheld in his con-
tention; but if his insistence is frivolous, mali-
cious and unreasonable so as to be arbitrary and 
. clearly show conduct not prompted by good faith, 
it will be ineffective and of no avail." 
page 855, Section 978, as follows: 
"Statutes providing for the remission or re-
duction of penalties, interest charges, and costs 
imposed upon delinquent taxpayers are liberally 
construed in favor of the taxpayer. The grant to 
tax officers of power to remit penalties for tax 
delinquencies includes power to remit interest 
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charges imposed by statute in respect of delin-
quent taxes, such charges being in the nature of 
penalties." 
61 Corpus Juris, page 1518, Section 2227, as 
follows: 
"The circumstances attending the nonpay-
ment of taxes may be such as to warrant the 
courts in refusing to enforce payment of interest 
imposed by statutes on delinquent taxpayers." 
and Section 2229, as follows: 
"Construction of such statutes. Statutes for 
remission of interest, being remedial in character, 
should be liberally construed, and extended to all 
cases fairly coming within the reason or rule 
thereof; and although permissive in form should 
be given a mandatory effect." 
It cannot have been and, as shown by the statu-
tory provisions quoted above, was not the intention 
of the Legislature to coerce, by threat of a heavy 
penalty should a taxpayer resort to this Court, the 
payment of taxes to which the State may not be 
rightly entitled. It is Kennecott's right to submit 
this litigation to this Court for review on both facts 
and law. 
Under all the circumstances it is the Commis-
sion's duty in this case to waive interest, as it is 
, empowered by ,the statute. 
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The following authorities demonstrate that such 
a power to waive interest to avoid injustice cannot 
be arbitrarily withheld, but that under such circum-
stances the power must be exercised,. 
It was held in Commonwealth v. Southern Pac. 
Co., 169 Ky. 296, 183 S.W. 925, that: 
".Two questions are presented for decision: 
First, may the interest and penalties provided by 
the statute for failure to pay taxes on or before 
the 1st of December be exacted from the taxpayer 
where he exercises his statutory right to appeal 
from the action of the board of supervisors in 
assessing his property if his appeal so taken is 
not acted upon by the quarterly court until after 
the 1st of December following, the time which the 
statute fixes for the interest and penalty to 
attach! Second, is it incumbent upon a taxpayer 
taking such an appeal to tender any taxes, the 
amount of which has not been ascertained? 
"The first proposition resolves itself into 
the question whether the taxpayer is delinquent 
until he has had an opportunity to voluntarily pay 
his taxes, and which have previously been defi-
nitely fixed or the amount of which could have 
been by him, approximately ascertained before 
the penalty attaches. In this case, *** as long as 
the appeals were pending in the. quarterly court 
it was impossible for the company,io know what 
the final amount: of the assessment might be, and 
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it would have been nothing short of a reckless 
guess for it to have undertaken to approximately 
fix the amount of its taxes for any one of the 
years involved, so as to have tendered the same 
before the interest and penalty attached, 
• • • 
«### Here the taxpayer did not know what 
he hkd to pay until the final assessment was made 
by the quarterly court. *** If under these con-
ditions the agency selected by the state to finally 
assess the property fails to assess it before the 
time fixed for the interest and penalties to attach, 
will this failure be allowed to operate so as to 
penalize the taxpayer? So far as this record 
shows, the appellee is not responsible for this 
delay; it only exercised a right expressly granted 
by the statute. The commonwealth was the mov-
ing party, and it would seem to be its duty to 
urge such proceedings to a speedy determination, 
and if it fails to do so before the interest and 
penalties attach, it would be inequitable and un-
just to enforce their collection. 
"At any rate, the state agency charged with 
the duty of finally assessing this property on the 
appeal failed to discharge that duty, for some 
reason not entirely apparent from this record, 
before the time fixed for the interest and penal-
ties to attach, and that failure should not be per-
mitted to operate so as to penalize a taxpayer for 
not paying his taxes before his property has been 
finally assessed, and before he could possibly 
know their amount. To do so would be to penalize 
a taxpayer for exercising the right of appeal 
which the statute expressly gives him. Clearly it 
could not have been the legislative purpose to 
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exact from a taxpayer a penalty for failure to pay 
his taxes when the agency selected by the state 
for that purpose has not assessed his property in 
time for him to have voluntarily paid the tax in 
time to escape the penalty. To so interpret the 
statute would be to convict the General Assembly 
of a deliberate purpose to do a palpable wrong 
to the taxpayers, and this we do not believe and 
are not authorized to infer. It follows from what 
we have said that the statute could not have in-
tended that the interest and penalties should be 
exacted when the taxpayer has had no oppor-
tunity to voluntarily pay his taxes before they 
ordinarily attach under its terms. 
"Before the board of supervisors the company 
filed each year a statement giving what it con-
ceived to be the assessable value of the floating 
equipment to the company, but contending all 
along that the taxable situs was not in Jefferson 
county, and it is now strenuously insisted that, 
after taking the various appeals to the quarterly 
court, it was obligatory upon the part of the com-
pany to at least tender the taxes pending the 
appeals to the quarterly court on the conceded 
valuation of the property. 
«#•• Undoubtedly it is not only within the 
power of a chancellor, but it is his duty, when 
being so applied to, to put the applicant upon 
such terms as will not delay the prompt collec-
tion of taxes which he concedes to be due; but 
the quarterly court occupied a very different atti-
tude. It was only a state agency, acting in £ 
ministerial capacity in the assessment of property 
under our assessment and taxation statute. It had 
no power to enter any judgment for taxes. It had 
no authority to put the company upon any sort 
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of terms before it would hear its appeal. Its sole 
power is, under the statute, to determine whether 
the property is or not assessable, and, if so, what 
is its assessable value. 
"The statute requires no tender, and puts no 
condition whatever upon the right of appeal; and, 
while it is apparent that it was contemplated by 
the statute that an appeal would, under ordinary 
circumstances, be disposed of in time for the 
taxpayer to pay his taxes without incurring the 
interest and penalties, yet there is no provision 
fixing the time within which the quarterly court 
shall dispose of such an appeal; and, if that 
agency so selected by the state fails to dispose of 
such an appeal and make the final assessment so 
that the taxpayer would have an opportunity to 
escape such penalty and interest, manifestly the 
taxpayer should not be penalized because of such 
failure, and should not be expected to make a 
tender of an amount which has not been ascer-
tained, and which necessarily is indefinite and 
uncertain, 
"The suggestion that the taxes on the con-
ceded valuation might have been tendered to the 
sheriff is untenable. The assessment was not 
final. **# 
"It is apparent from the whole record that 
the delay in the quarterly court was either because 
of the failure of the commonwealth to push to a 
speedy determination a proceeding which it had 
instituted to assess this property, or because of 
the mutual acquiescence in such delay by all 
parties. • '•'•-• •-
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"Judgment affirmed." 
State v. Coos County, 115 Ore. 300, 237 P. 678, 
the court held : 
"We are of the opinion that the words used, 
to wit, 'The county courts of the several counties 
of the state may and are hereby authorized to 
remit/ etc., when used in the connection in which 
they appear in the act, should be construed as 
mandatory. While in form permissible, they are 
peremptory when used to clothe a public officer 
with the power to do an act which ought to be done 
for the sake of justice, or which concerns the 
public interest or the rights of third persons. Ex 
parte Banks, 28 Ala, 28; Rex v. Barlow, 2 Salk. 
609; Johnston v. Pate, 95 N.C. 68; Lynn v. County 
Com'rs, 148 Mass. 148, 19 N.E. 171; Bowen v. 
Minneapolis, 47 Minn. 115, 49 N.W. 683, 28 Am. 
St. Rep. 333; and various other authorities to 
that effect, which will be found in a note to sec-
tion 636, vol. 2 (2d Ed.) Lewis' Sutherland Statu-
tory Construction." 
Commenting upon the case of Commonwealth 
v. Southern Pacific Company, supra, the court said 
in Bingham's Administrator v. Commonwealth, 196 
Ky. 257, 244 S.W. 781, at 791: 
"The tax due in that case (Commonwealth v. 
Southern Pacific Company, supra), a franchise 
tax, before it became due by or collectible from 
the owner, had to be assessed against it in some 
one of the several ways in which property is 
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assessed for taxation, and the owner was not 
delinquent in any duty imposed upon him by law 
until such assessment was ascertained according 
to law. The property of the owner having been 
assessed against it by the board of equalization at 
an exorbitant figure, the owner, as the law gave 
it the right to do before the assessment became 
final, appealed to the quarterly court for review 
of the board's assessment. The quarterly court 
materially reduced the assessment, and the owner 
promptly paid the taxes thus found to be due. We 
held that the owner should not be required to pay 
penalties when it was not delinquent in its duty 
to pay the taxes it owed; that it was not delin-
quent during the pendency of the appeal to the 
quarterly court, as the law gave it that right; and, 
that to charge it interest and other penalties the 
law imposed for delinquency would be unfair and 
was not intended, although another and general 
law provided that all taxes, unless otherwise 
specially provided, should be due on the 1st day 
of March after assessment, and become delin-
quent if not paid on the 1st day of December 
thereafter." 
And it was held in Commonwealth v. Bingham's 
Administrator, 187 Ky. 749, 220 S. W. 727, at 730, 
as follows: 
"•*** The law neither demands nor expects 
the impossible, nor will a court by its decree 
penalize a person for the nonpayment of a tax, 
the amount of which is not only uncertain, but at 
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the present time is still undetermined, and this 
through no fault of the party sought to be 
charged. *** 
"We are told that a wide expanse of time and 
territory were covered in the proof taking, after 
which the appraiser filed a voluminous report. 
This being true, should we charge a dereliction of 
duty to appellee because the overworked court, 
to whom the matter was submitted, has not had 
time to render a decision ? We think not. Appellee 
is without fault in the premises, and we are unable 
to find wherein it has failed or neglected to per-
form any duty required of it. 
• • • 
"As said in State v. Certain Lands in Red-
wood County, 40 Minn. 512,42 N. W. 473 : 
" 'A penalty for the nonpayment of a tax can-
not be imposed until the person has an oppor-
tunity to pay it, and fails to do so. '" 
And in Bingham's Administrator v. Common-
wealth, 199 Ky. 402, 251 S. W. 936, it was said: 
"Upon the question of interest upon the 
amount of the tax as finally determined, the cir-
cuit judge, in his written opinion upon which the 
judgment is based, has so accurately analyzed the 
cases from this court upon the question and so 
admirably stated the rules deducible therefrom 
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under varying circumstances that we have de-
cided, to adopt it, as we do the conclusion that, 
under the facts of this case, interest runs only 
from the date of the judgment herein. It reads: 
4
 (7) Where the commonwealth delays the 
assessment, the taxpayer should be charged with 
interest only from the time of the assessment. 
. *## 
4The allowance of interest is, in the last 
analysis, by way of penalty upon the property 
owner, for having done that which he ought not 
to have done. The history of this case has been 
very unusual. When it is considered that the tax 
supervisors, with the advice of the state revenue 
authorities, were responsible for the failure of a 
timely assessment early in 1918, and thereby 
forced the administrator into prolonged litiga-
tion, which included a justifiable defense against 
a totally unwarranted charge of delinquency and 
claim to enormous penalties, it would seem in-
equitable to charge the administrator with offen-
sive delay, and to impose upon it the payment of 
- interest from a date earlier than this, the first 
assessment of the properties. These conclusions 
seem to accord with the philosophy of the four 
opinions hereinbefore digested. ***' " 
I t was said in Re Clark, 105 Mont. 401, 74 P. 
2d 401, 114 A.L.R. 496, that: 
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«#** w e think this contention has been most 
effectively disposed of in the case of In re Estate 
of Irwin, 196 Cal. 366,237 P. 1074,1078 wherein the 
court said: 'If the proviso be construed to mean 
"any or all litigation," it would necessarily follow7 
that even a litigant who had successfully proved 
in court his contentions as to the invalidity of a 
tax imposed would be liable for the imposition of 
the interest of 10 per cent, as a penalty for sub-
mitting his objections to a court for adjudication, 
for even successful litigation would be "litigation 
to defeat the payment of a tax/' Such a result 
would obviously be an absurdity/ " 
n 
"The Arkansas Supreme Court has reached 
the same conclusion in the construction of a simi-
lar statute in the case of State v. Lane, Executor, 
134 Ark. 71, 203 S. W. 17. See, also, In re Duncan's 
Estate, 119 Wash. 426, 206 P. 1." 
In State v. Certain Lands in Redwood County, 
40 Minn. 512, 42 N.W. 473, at 476-7-8; affirmed in 
159 U. S. 526, 16 S. Ct. 83, 40 L. ed. 247: 
«### rp0 r e n ( j e r a person chargeable with 
interest there must be a promise, express or im-
plied, to pay it, or some default of duty on his 
part in not sooner paying the money. Sibley v. 
Pine Co., 31 Minn. 201, 17 N.W.Kep. 337. # # # If, 
under such circumstances, in the absence of any 
default on his part, the legislature can impose 
interest retrospectively, there is no reason why 
it might not also impose certain penalties for the 
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nonpayment of the tax, for both stand, in this 
respect, on the same footing. Both are in the 
nature of damages for a default of legal duty. *** 
"*** One thing is very certain: that a penalty 
in any form cannot be imposed until a party is in 
default in some legal duty. A penalty for the non-
payment of a tax cannot be imposed until the per-
son has an opportunity to pay it, and fails to do 
so. What we have heretofore said regarding 'in-
terest' is equally applicable to penalties. Now, 
as the whole tax extended against a tract of land 
is an entirety, the owner cannot pay a part of it 
without paying the whole, and if a part of it is 
illegal, and he pays the whole, ordinarily it would 
be a voluntary payment, and he could not recover 
back the illegal part. Hence in such case his only 
remedy is to wait until proceedings are com-
menced to enforce judgment against his land, and 
then defend against the illegal part of the tax, 
and until it is deducted by the judgment of the 
court he has had no opportunity to pay the valid 
pg,rt of the tax, and consequently has been guilty 
of no default." 
State v. Hughes Brothers Timber Company, 163 
Minn. 4, 203 N.W. 436 at 438; reversed in 272 U. S. 
469, 47 S. Ct. 170, 71 L. ed. 359, on the ground that 
tlie property taxed was in interstate commerce: 
"The original assessment was on 10,000 cords, 
but in fact there were only 8,367 cords. The tax 
: was reduced accordingly by the decision below, 
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but, notwithstanding, the statutory interest and 
penalties were sustained as to the reduced 
amount. In that we think there was error. Under 
the principle of County of Eedwood v. Winona & 
St. Peter Land Co., 40 Minn. 512, 41 N. W. 465, 
42 N. W. 473, neither interest nor penalties can 
be imposed upon the taxpayer until he defaults in 
payment. Defendants had no opportunity to pay 
the correct amount of the tax until it was deter-
mined. Until then they were not in default, so all 
they can be held for is interest on the tax from the 
time it was so determined. *** 
«##* ^ e a r e n o w c o n c e r n e ( j w i ^ default in 
payment, and there was no such default until the 
correct amount was ascertained, and that was not 
until the filing of the order for judgment." 
State v. Great Northern Railway Company, 160 
Minn. 515, 200 N. W. 834, at 839: 
"The right of the state to assess omitted earn-
ings is not questioned. 
"The statute provides for a direct penalty of 
5 per cent, and an interest penalty of 1 per cent, 
a month. The assessment was against the Great 
Northern for all of the years from 1901 to 1912 
inclusive. The draft was drawn for that amount 
including penalty and intereat from April 23, 
1913, the date of the enactment of the statute. 
It was largely in excess of the .amount actually 
due. The defense was justifiable; and in part 
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successful. There was no opportunity to pay the 
amount due without paying the excessive amount 
claimed. Interest and a penalty should not be 
imposed. County of Redwood v. Winona, etc., 40 
Minn. 512, 41 N. W. 465, 42 N. W. 473; U. S. Trust 
Co. v. New Mexico, 183 U.S. 535, 22 S. Ct. 172, 
46 L. ed. 315; Gallup v. Schmidt, 154 Ind. 196, 
56 N. E. 443; Lake Shore, etc., v. People, 46 Mich. 
193, 9 N. W. 249. 
"It was provided by Laws 1917, c. 398 (Gen. 
St. Supp. 1917, §§ 90-1 to 90-3) among other 
things, that uncollected drafts then in the hands 
of the Attorney General should be delivered to 
the treasurer. The treasurer was authorized to 
receive part payment. The state insists that after 
this statute the interest penalty should commence. 
We do not take this view." 
United States Trust Co. v. New Mexico, 183 U. 
S. 535, 22 S. Ct. 172, 46 L. ed. 315: 
"Until the amount of legal taxes was defi-
nitely ascertained, the owners of this property 
had no opportunity of paying such taxes, and 
were therefore not in default in not paying; hence 
the claim for back interest is not a valid one. *** 
"*** The owners of the road were therefore 
justified in contesting their liability to such 
assessment and taxation in gross, and until there 
was an identification of the property subject to 
taxation and a determination of the amount of 
taxes due, it would be inequitable to charge penal-
ties for nonpayment. *** 
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"Viewing the proceedings from an equitable 
standpoint, we see no error in refusing interest 
prior to the decree." 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the Commission is contrary to 
the provisions of the statute imposing the Utah 
State Franchise Tax; if given effect, it would de-
prive Kennecott of its property without due process 
of law and would impose an undue burden on inter* 
state commerce in violation of the Utah and Federal 
constitutions. Accordingly, the decision of the 
Commission should be reversed by this Court 
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